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[This article considers a recent regulatory approach to addressing disadvantage experienced by 
women at the Australian Bar. The Model Equal Opportunity Briefing Policy for Female Barristers 
and Advocates (‘MBP’) developed by the Law Council of Australia in 2004 was a popular initiative 
which received widespread support. This article examines the origins and assumptions underpinning 
the policy. It is contended that while the policy is a genuine attempt to ameliorate the dismal plight of 
women at the Bar, it is narrow in application and effect. It is argued that this policy is a product of 
the prevalent Australian approach to policymaking which avoids any mention of ‘affirmative action’. 
The article traces how this aversion is justified less by principle than rhetorical use of the idea of 
merit. Finally, it is contended that when we consider the case of briefing practices in Australia, merit 
is a contestable concept which does not provide a sufficient reason to reject out of hand other policy 
approaches.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
In most Western countries today, women graduate from law school in roughly 
the same proportion as men.1 However, there remains a large disparity between 
men and women in the rates of retention and seniority within most legal profes-
sions. For instance, a report by the Victorian Women Lawyers in 1999 noted that 
there is a much higher rate of women than men not going on to practise law or 
leaving legal practice within the first few years.2 In the United States, Canada, 
 
 * BA (Hons), PhD (La Trobe), JD (Melb); Lecturer, TC Beirne School of Law, The University of 
Queensland. I am very grateful to Professor Charles Rickett, Dr Heather Douglas and Dr Jona-
than Crowe for taking the time to read a draft of this article and for their insightful comments. I 
also thank the anonymous referees for their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article as 
well as the invaluable proofreading and substantive comments made by the Editorial Board of 
the Melbourne University Law Review. 
 1 See Caroline Kirton, Explanatory Memorandum to Gender Appearance Survey Information 
August 2006 (2006) 6 <http://www.wlact.org.au/Documents/Explanatory%20Memorandum 
%2010%20August%202006.pdf>; Christopher Roper, The Centre for Legal Education, Depart-
ment of Employment, Education and Training, Career Intentions of Australian Law Students 
(1995) 15. 
 2 Victorian Women Lawyers, Taking up the Challenge — Women in the Legal Profession (1999) 1. 
A report on a survey of practitioners in Queensland has also indicated that while 38 per cent of 
the solicitors’ branch were women, they represented 62 per cent of solicitors under the age of 29: 
Terry Hutchinson, Equalising Opportunities in the Law Committee, Queensland Law Society, 
2003 Membership Survey: The Report (2006) 13–14. 
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England and Wales, the trend is the same.3 This disparity between ‘success’ 
achieved by men and women in Australian legal practice has been noted by law 
societies, Bar associations and law reform committees across the country for 
some time.4 While it is conceded that success is necessarily a subjective and 
relative concept, this article proceeds on the basis that women’s position in the 
legal profession and experience in their working lives cannot be solely attributed 
to a free ‘choice’.5 
This article considers an initiative to address women’s disadvantage in one 
branch6 of legal practice in Australia — the Bar. Like their solicitor counterparts, 
numerous studies in Australia and overseas have reported that women barristers 
face persistent disadvantage.7 Gender inequalities have been documented in 
 
 3 There is a plethora of literature documenting women’s entry and progression in the US: see, eg, 
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, ‘Women in the Legal Profession at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: 
Assessing Glass Ceilings and Open Doors’ (2001) 49 University of Kansas Law Review 733; 
Paula A Patton, ‘Women Lawyers, Their Status, Influence, and Retention in the Legal Profes-
sion’ (2005) 11 William and Mary Journal of Women and the Law 173. In the United Kingdom 
and Canada, studies have revealed similar statistical differences between men and women in 
retention and progression within the legal profession and have drawn similar conclusions as to 
the factors influencing this trend: see, eg, Hilary Sommerlad and Peter Sanderson, Gender, 
Choice and Commitment: Women Solicitors in England and Wales and the Struggle for Equal 
Status (1998); Hilary Sommerlad, ‘Women Solicitors in a Fractured Profession: Intersections of 
Gender and Professionalism in England and Wales’ (2002) 9 International Journal of the Legal 
Profession 213; Jane Brockman, Gender in the Legal Profession: Fitting or Breaking the Mould 
(2001); Jean McKenzie Leiper, Bar Codes: Women in the Legal Profession (2007). 
 4 See, eg, Keys Young, Ministry for the Status and Advancement of Women, New South Wales, 
Gender Bias and the Law: Women Working in the Legal Profession (1995); Jane Goodluck, 
Women Working in the Legal Profession in Tasmania: Final Report for Women Lawyers Associa-
tion of Tasmania (1996); Chief Justice’s Taskforce on Gender Bias, Report of Chief Justice’s 
Taskforce on Gender Bias (1994); Rosemary Hunter and Helen McKelvie, Victorian Bar Coun-
cil, Equality of Opportunity for Women at the Victorian Bar — A Report to the Victorian Bar 
Council (1998). 
 5 See, eg, Deborah Rhode’s discussion of the ‘myth of choice’ as a common explanation for 
persistent gender inequalities in the legal profession. She contends that ‘women lawyers face 
lingering double standards and double binds’ as they juggle competing work and family respon-
sibilities as well as competing narratives about the ideal lawyer and the ideal mother: Deborah L 
Rhode, ‘Gender and the Profession: An American Perspective’ in Ulrike Schultz and Gisela 
Shaw (eds), Women in the World’s Legal Professions (2003) 3, 13–15. 
 6 The structure of the legal profession in Australia varies between states and territories. Each 
jurisdiction has separate statutory frameworks for admission and certification, and separate 
professional bodies governing admission and discipline. Since April 2004, however, all states 
and territories have agreed to enact most aspects of the Law Council of Australia’s Legal Profes-
sion — Model Laws Project: Model Bill (Model Provisions) (2nd ed, 2006) <http://www.law 
council.asn.au/natpractice/currentstatus.html>. The amended Legal Profession Acts in each 
jurisdiction provide for a divided profession at least in practice — joint admission and separate 
certification as a barrister or solicitor and/or differing practical training post-admission (atten-
dance at a Bar Readers’ course and at least six months under ‘pupillage’ or mentoring by a more 
senior barrister). Most states and territories also have separate professional bodies for barristers 
and solicitors (as in Victoria, NSW, Queensland, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory). 
These professional bodies generally have delegated power to make rules governing the practice 
of barristers and solicitors, which typically allow barristers to act only as sole practitioners and 
limit the type of work they may perform to advocacy and advice work. 
 7 See above n 4. There has been less work conducted in the US concerning female advocates as 
the legal profession is not divided. However, several gender bias taskforces have considered the 
position and treatment of women litigators: see, eg, John C Coughenour et al, ‘The Effects of 
Gender in the Federal Court: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Taskforce’ 
(1993) 67 Southern California Law Review 745; Judge Marilyn Loftus, ‘First Year Report of the 
New Jersey Supreme Court Taskforce on Women in the Courts — June 1984’ (1986) 9 Women’s 
Rights Law Reporter 129. There have been more studies conducted in the UK, from which 
Australia has inherited its professional model, which refer to women as specialist advocates: see, 
eg, Lesley Holland and Lynne Spencer, The General Council of the Bar, Without Prejudice? Sex 
Equality at the Bar and in the Judiciary (1992). 
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statistical terms (such as lower representation in higher ranks, lower earnings 
and fewer appearances in superior courts) and in qualitative analyses (such as 
perceptions about a lack of ‘commitment’ inherent in women’s potential to have 
children, gendered assumptions about aptitudes to perform the advocacy role and 
homosocial behaviour at the Bar). The next Part of the article discusses in detail 
the findings of two empirical studies undertaken in relation to women’s experi-
ences of working at the Bar. These studies are significant not only for providing 
evidence of disadvantage experienced by women at the Bar, but also because 
they formed the basis for a regulatory response considered by this article. 
This response was the Model Equal Opportunity Briefing Policy for Female 
Barristers and Advocates (‘MBP’) developed by the Law Council of Australia in 
2004.8 It is contended that while this initiative has the potential to institute 
change leading to real advances for women at the Bar, it has been detached from 
the genesis of the policy and its specific objectives. To a large extent this is a 
result of compromises that are inevitable in the process of developing a national 
policy. However, it is argued that it can also be attributed to a strong antipathy to 
developing any regulatory initiative (law or policy) which could be described as 
a form of affirmative action.9 
‘Affirmative action’ has been a dirty phrase in the Australian political–legal 
context for at least the last 10 years. The chief criticism of such policies is that it 
is incompatible with merit-based selection and promotion. This concern is 
particularly pronounced in the legal profession, which retains a strong liberal 
ideology, valuing rationality and supposedly neutral and objective judgements of 
merit.10 This article examines the basis for this rejection of affirmative action 
policies. It considers how the two concepts of merit and affirmative action have 
been constructed in the context of the development of the MBP so as to allow for 
a limited set of policy options. 
Yet, it is contended that the MBP in its current form can be understood as a 
form of affirmative action, albeit a weak form. This article is concerned with 
renaming the policy and goes on to examine the formulation of the MBP as a 
policy-based on the assumption of an oppositional relationship between merit 
and affirmative action. It is submitted that this dichotomy in principle is not as 
firm as has been suggested, particularly in the case of awarding briefs to counsel. 
Rather, it functions as a discursive sleight of hand not based in firm argument as 
to competing principles or rationales. 
On the basis of this argument, this article ultimately calls for two outcomes: 
first, the MBP should be amended to include more targeted objectives to be 
 
 8 Equalising Opportunities in Law Committee, Law Council of Australia, Model Equal Opportu-
nity Briefing Policy for Female Barristers and Advocates (2004) <http://www.law 
council.asn.au/get/policies/2443254835/0.pdf> (‘MBP’). 
 9 At this stage, ‘affirmative action’ is used in a generic sense to describe all forms of regulation 
addressing perceived disadvantages of a group. The term will be further described in Part VI of 
this article. 
 10 Liberalism has been criticised from many angles. Feminist legal scholars have criticised liberal 
individualism and its understanding of equality on the basis that equality is defined against men. 
Feminists have pointed out that an assumption that men and women were similarly situated in 
society strengthens existing power relations rather than disturbs them. It is not within the scope 
of this article to fully engage with feminist debate in this area. For a discussion of this, see Maria 
Drakopoulou, ‘The Ethic of Care, Female Subjectivity and Feminist Legal Scholarship’ (2000) 8 
Feminist Legal Studies 199. For a discussion of the jurisprudence of liberal individualism, see 
Ngaire Naffine, Law and the Sexes: Explorations in Feminist Jurisprudence (1990). 
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achieved by ‘harder’ measures; secondly, a range of measures should be consid-
ered in formulating any regulatory response to disadvantaged groups. 
I I   DESCRIBING DISADVANTAGE THROUGH BRIEFING PRACTICES 
Over the last 15 years, there has been a large amount of academic attention 
directed towards addressing the continuing gender imbalance in the legal 
profession in Australia and throughout the Western world.11 Although many 
causes have been identified, there is no consensus as to a single area of concern 
or any one solution.12 While women have historically been excluded from the 
profession, there are now few formal barriers to their entry and success within 
the profession.13 For this reason, there are some within the profession who have 
argued that it is simply a matter of time before the problem will resolve itself, or 
that a time lag exists as a result of the historical predominance of men in the 
legal profession. However, as Justice Mary Gaudron has observed: ‘[t]he trouble 
with women of my generation is that we thought if we knocked the doors down, 
success would be inevitable’.14 A decade later this has not occurred. Not surpris-
ingly, as the Chief Justice of the Victorian Supreme Court, Marilyn Warren, has 
commented, ‘there is impatience that change is not occurring more rapidly’ and 
‘[t]here is irritation at ongoing discrimination against women.’15 
In Australia, two large empirical studies of the Australian Bar have been under-
taken to test long held anecdotal wisdom that gender plays a significant role in 
the Bar’s culture and practices. The first study, commissioned by the Victorian 
Bar Council and undertaken by Rosemary Hunter and Helen McKelvie in  
1997–98, was a wide-ranging review of the culture of the Victorian Bar as 
recorded by court appearances and interviews with barristers, judges, clerks and 
 
 11 See, eg, Margaret Thornton, Dissonance and Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession (1996); 
Patton, above n 3; Deborah L Rhode, ‘The “No-Problem” Problem: Feminist Challenges and 
Cultural Change’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1731; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Portia Redux: 
Another Look at Gender, Feminism and Legal Ethics’ (1994) 2 Virginia Journal of Social Policy 
& the Law 75; Nancy J Reichman and Joyce S Sterling, ‘Sticky Floors, Broken Steps, and Con-
crete Ceilings in Legal Careers’ (2004) 14 Texas Journal of Women and the Law 27; Christine 
Alice Corcos, ‘Portia Goes to Parliament: Women and Their Admission to Membership in the 
English Legal Profession’ (1998) 75 Denver University Law Review 307; Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, 
Women in Law (1st ed, 1981). 
 12 Of course, there are factors which are generally agreed to pose obstacles for many women 
related to family responsibilities, continued discriminatory practices within the profession and so 
on: see above n 11. 
 13 For a thorough discussion of the history of women’s exclusion from the Australian legal 
profession, see Thornton, Dissonance and Distrust, above n 11. While the legal profession has 
undoubtedly changed, Hunter points out that there remain some formal (if indirect) barriers to 
entry in NSW which require a large initial outlay to purchase chambers: Rosemary Hunter, 
‘Discrimination against Women Barristers: Evidence from a Study of Court Appearances and 
Briefing Practices’ (2005) 12 International Journal of the Legal Profession 3, 4. Most jurisdic-
tions require that junior barristers undertake a period of mentoring or pupillage. While generally 
appointment of a senior barrister to undertake this role is a formality, Bar rules leave this ap-
pointment process to the barristers. Further discussion of this practice is not within the scope of 
this article. However, this is an area that requires further research given the difficulty junior 
women barristers often experience in developing networks at the Bar. 
 14 Justice Mary Gaudron, ‘Speech to Launch Australian Women Lawyers’ (Speech delivered at the 
Australian Women Lawyers Launch, Melbourne, 19 September 1997). 
 15 Justice Marilyn Warren, ‘Promoting Difference’ (Speech delivered at the Victorian Women 
Lawyer Achievement Awards, Melbourne, 15 May 2003). 
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briefing solicitors.16 This study produced reliable empirical data that documented 
significantly lower levels of seniority, rates of advancement and court appear-
ances for female as opposed to male barristers.17 It also provided a detailed 
qualitative analysis of the data gathered and recommendations for change within 
the profession. Hunter, writing in 2003, concluded that the study appeared to 
show that the ‘greatest barrier to change is the culture of the Bar itself’.18 Hunter 
and McKelvie reported that there were a number of aspects of the ‘hegemonic 
masculinity’19 of Bar culture which impacted directly on female barristers.20 
These included an image of the model barrister as working long hours and 
showing complete commitment21 to the profession which many women could 
not or were presumed not to demonstrate; a prevailing belief that women were 
unsuitable or lacking aptitude for many core practices of an advocate which were 
predefined as requiring masculine qualities; and the much celebrated collegiality 
or ‘fraternity’ of the Bar which, far from supporting women, often formed 
internal barriers excluding women.22 
The Hunter and McKelvie report, therefore, provided strong evidence that 
female barristers at all levels of seniority experienced disadvantage and often 
direct discrimination, contesting the notion that inequality of opportunities at the 
Bar would be wholly remedied by a ‘natural increase’ in numbers over time.23 
Their report concluded that the dreary statistics are influenced by what Cynthia 
Fuchs Epstein describes as ‘gendered constraints’ — that career choices are 
imposed on women rather than chosen by them.24 This may be in the form of 
direct discrimination,25 or subtle forms of indirect discrimination such as the 
imposition of ostensibly neutral environments that favour men. In particular, 
their report pointed to inequitable briefing practices as discriminating against 
female barristers both directly and indirectly. The MBP, which this article 
discusses, is a response to the findings of the Hunter and McKelvie report. 
Nearly 10 years later, the Australian Women Lawyers’ Gender Appearance 
Survey Information: August 2006 (‘Gender Appearance Survey’) indicates that 
there continues to be a vast disparity in the gender balance of senior barristers in 
 
 16 Hunter and McKelvie, above n 4. The project consisted of a literature review, 125 interviews 
with legal personnel, two focus groups with members of list committees and a study of court and 
tribunal appearances over a three-month period. A more detailed discussion of the methodology 
adopted is provided in the report: at 4. 
 17 Ibid xi. 
 18 Rosemary Hunter, ‘Women Barristers and Gender Difference’ in Ulrike Shultz and Gisela Shaw 
(eds), Women in the World’s Legal Professions (2003) 103, 104. 
 19 The authors refer to the work of Margaret Thornton, who points to the overlap of constructions 
of masculinity and of law as rational, authoritative and objective: Thornton, Dissonance and 
Distrust, above n 11, 8. Thus, this ‘discursive correlation results in an empirical correlation’ so 
that men are constructed as suited to law: Hunter, ‘Women Barristers and Gender Difference’, 
above n 18, 106. Hunter also notes here the emergence of the notion of ‘hegemonic masculinity’. 
 20 Hunter and McKelvie, above n 4, 31. 
 21 For a discussion of the legal profession in England and Wales which documents the importance 
of ‘commitment’ as a core value of professionalism, see Sommerlad and Sanderson, above n 3. 
 22 See Sharon C Bolton and Daniel Muzio, ‘Can’t Live with ‘Em; Can’t Live without ‘Em: 
Gendered Segmentation in the Legal Profession’ (2007) 41 Sociology 47; Celia Davies, ‘The 
Sociology of Professions and the Profession of Gender’ (1996) 30 Sociology 661. 
 23 Hunter and McKelvie, above n 4, xii. 
 24 Epstein, Women in Law, above n 11, 79–81. 
 25 For an account of women’s exclusion from the legal profession in Australia, see Thornton, 
above n 11. 
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Australia.26 There are far fewer female than male senior counsel in each jurisdic-
tion.27 In addition, women on average receive fewer complex, important or long 
running briefs than men, and are paid proportionally less.28 These figures bear 
out Justice Michael Kirby’s lament that, during his more than 10 years on the 
High Court of Australia, he has observed ‘few female advocates with “speaking 
parts”.’29 While these empirical results were not accompanied by the detailed 
analyses of the Hunter and McKelvie report,30 this data indicates that similar 
factors relating to gender disadvantage continue to prevail. As Hunter found, 
while court appearances were a function of seniority at the Bar, particularly in 
superior courts,31 ‘sex emerged as the only significant factor’ when their results 
were adjusted to take account of lower rates of senior women.32 In other words, 
even proportionally, senior women receive fewer briefs to appear in superior 
courts than their male counterparts. 
In addition, the Gender Appearance Survey also reported that no female junior 
counsel to senior counsel appeared during the survey periods33 in any civil 
matter in the Northern Territory34 and only one appeared in Queensland,35 while 
the highest appearance rate, in the Federal Court of Australia, was of just 18.8 
per cent of civil matters.36 Therefore, not only do women appear to be hitting 
glass ceilings, but they also appear to be less likely to receive opportunities at a 
junior level at the Bar. This affects women’s promotion prospects as well as their 
enjoyment in their career at its early stages.37 
 
 26 Australian Women Lawyers, Gender Appearance Survey Information: August 2006 (2006). The 
Gender Appearance Survey collected data from surveys completed by court staff. These surveys 
requested that the sex and seniority of the barrister appearing be recorded in each matter as well 
as the type and duration of the matter. Surveys were completed in courts of all levels in state, 
territory and federal courts with the exception of Victorian courts and the Family Court of Aus-
tralia. 
 27 There are 15 female silks out of 219 silks in Victoria (Victorian Bar Directory); 3 female silks 
out of 130 silks in Queensland (Queensland Barristers Directory); 16 female silks out of 350 
silks in NSW (NSW Barristers Directory); 1 female silk out of 183 silks in Western Australia 
(WA Barristers Directory); 5 female silks out of 26 silks in South Australia (South Australian 
Barristers Directory); no female silks out of 30 silks in the ACT (ACT Barristers Directory); no 
female silks out of 6 silks in Tasmania (Tasmanian Independent Bar Directory); 1 female silk out 
of 7 silks in the Northern Territory (Northern Territory Barristers Directory). 
 28 Hunter, ‘Discrimination against Women Barristers’, above n 13. 
 29 Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Appellate Advocacy — New Challenges’ (Speech delivered at the Dame 
Ann Ebsworth Memorial Lecture, London, 21 February 2006) 41 <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/ 
speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj_21feb06.pdf>. 
 30 The type of matter, gender of senior and junior counsel appearing and length of court appearance 
were recorded. While this study covered most of Australia, it was more modest than the Hunter 
and McKelvie study because it did not consider how briefs were awarded. 
 31 That is, it is more likely that those appearing in superior courts are senior counsel or senior 
junior counsel. As women represent a small percentage of senior counsel, their appearances in 
superior courts are likely to be proportionally lower. 
 32 Hunter, ‘Discrimination against Women Barristers’, above n 13, 9. 
 33 Gender Appearance Survey, above n 26, 3 lists the survey periods by court. The surveys were 
not conducted concurrently but rather the survey periods generally ran for two to four months 
through 2004 and 2005. 
 34 Ibid 17. 
 35 Ibid 20. 
 36 Ibid 44. See also Caroline Kirton, ‘Has the System Failed Women?’ (Speech to the Judicial 
Appointments Forum, Australian Bar Association, Sydney, 27 October 2006) 7. 
 37 Justice Marcia Neave, ‘Women Barristers Talk — Hearts and Minds, the Next Step’ (Speech 
delivered at the Women Barristers’ Association Anniversary Dinner, Melbourne, 23 November 
2006) 2 <http://www.vicbar.com.au/GetFile.ashx?file=BarAssocWomenFiles%2fWomen+Bar 
risters+-+Final+1.pdf>. The Bar has a far worse ratio of women to men than in the solicitors’ 
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The Gender Appearance Survey also significantly documented a nationwide 
trend of women being briefed in certain areas of law, or, viewed another way, not 
being briefed in certain areas of law.38 In most states, women received far fewer 
(or no) briefs for civil matters at any level of seniority.39 There was also a much 
lower reported rate of senior female counsel appearing in criminal matters in 
superior courts.40 While the survey does not provide detailed data as to specific 
areas of law or the nature of briefs received by those appearing in court, it 
indicates that women barristers are receiving fewer briefs in civil or commercial 
areas or, where they receive briefs in these areas, the briefs are of a minor nature 
or in a lower court. In this sense, the Gender Appearance Survey replicates 
longstanding empirical and qualitative findings in Australia and internationally. 
For instance, Margaret Thornton’s important commentary on the Australian legal 
profession in Dissonance and Distrust documented the enduring stereotypes as 
to the archetypal advocate and the resulting relegation of women into ‘feminine’ 
areas of law. She states that women ‘are significantly overrepresented in the least 
prestigious and least remunerative areas of practice and significantly underrepre-
sented among the most elite positions’,41 which is also argued by Deborah Rhode 
with respect to the US profession.42 Hunter and McKelvie’s report also found 
that women barristers were ‘significantly over-represented in family law, and 
significantly under-represented in commercial law, common law and personal 
injuries’.43 Many of their interviewees indicated that this was largely due to the 
‘push’ factor, where clerks steered junior female barristers into ‘feminine’ areas 
due to stereotypical assumptions about women’s abilities and interests.44 
Solicitors were also reported to adopt similar reasoning when appointing 
counsel, often referring to client preference or strategy in Family Court mat-
ters.45 While due regard to the individual concerns of a client or finding a 
barrister best suited to the case are beyond reproach, this does not explain the 
empirical research outlined above which indicates that women are being briefed 
 
branch. For instance, in Queensland, while the reports vary, women comprise approximately 40 
per cent of the solicitors in that state: Queensland Law Society, 79th Annual Report (2007) 10 
<http://www.qls.com.au/content/lwp/wcm/resources/file/ebb7974c5a8caf2/06-07-qls-annual-
report-WEB.pdf>. 
 38 For a summary of significant disparities, see Kirton, above n 1, 3. The Gender Appearance 
Survey results do not provide empirical data in relation to appearances in the Family Court. In 
light of the qualitative research discussed in the text and the results of the Gender Appearance 
Survey, this data may therefore indicate only a small snapshot of where women practise at the 
Bar. 
 39 Gender Appearance Survey, above n 26, 6. 
 40 Ibid. Hunter has documented some of the complexities and ‘contradictions’ of criminal law that 
are significantly influenced by gendered stereotypes: Hunter, ‘Discrimination against Women 
Barristers’, above n 13, 24–8. 
 41 Thornton, Dissonance and Distrust, above n 11, 191. 
 42 Deborah L Rhode, ‘Gender and Professional Roles’ (1994) 63 Fordham Law Review 39, 59. In 
the US, there is a wealth of scholarship which has provided empirical support for and examined 
the reasons behind this trend: see, eg, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Comparative Sociology of 
Women Lawyers: The “Feminisation” of the Legal Profession’ (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 897; Epstein, ‘Women in the Legal Profession at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century’, 
above n 3; Patton, above n 3. In the UK, Helena Kennedy has made similar observations of the 
English Bar: Helena Kennedy, Eve Was Framed: Women and British Justice (1992) 44–5. 
 43 Hunter, ‘Discrimination against Women Barristers’, above n 13, 19. 
 44 Hunter and McKelvie, above n 4, 93. 
 45 Ibid 90. 
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in these areas (although often in the lower courts)46 at the expense of receiving 
briefs in other areas. 
In all states in Australia, barristers practise as sole practitioners. They are 
therefore vulnerable to the same financial imperatives as any small business 
person. In particular, they are reliant on receiving briefs which sustain their 
practice, and developing a reputation which ensures repeat business and a 
progression in the level of work offered. This not only requires their clerk47 or 
solicitors to provide them with regular briefs but also requires the establishment 
of a profile by accessing more senior barristers and attracting more ‘prestigious 
briefs’.48 This is an important practical reality for all barristers, particularly those 
beginning their careers. Hunter and McKelvie’s report noted that it was often 
more difficult for female barristers to establish themselves because many senior 
male barristers in Victoria were inclined to recommend a junior from the ‘boys 
club’.49 In addition, they found that in some cases when junior women received 
briefs to work with senior counsel they were ‘faced with denigrating comments 
from their male colleagues about how they managed to secure the brief — with 
the implication or direct assertion that it was on the basis of their looks, or in 
return for sexual favours, rather than on merit’.50 Such incidents, Hunter 
maintains, ‘undermine women’s professional legitimacy and “chill” the climate 
of junior work for women’.51 
Hunter and McKelvie’s study also consisted of interviews with solicitors about 
their briefing practices, which revealed similar inclinations to brief both senior 
and junior counsel according to established networks. They found that the 
overwhelming factor influencing briefing was ‘personal rapport between 
solicitors and barristers’.52 Word of mouth also played a significant role.53 While 
 
 46 Hunter notes that there is still substantial anecdotal evidence, as well as some evidence from her 
research, that women are not receiving briefs to appear in family law matters which concern 
untested areas of law or significant monetary disputes. Indeed, Hunter comments that in such 
instances, ‘[t]he notion that “senior” is synonymous with “male” may still … operate to negate 
client preferences for a woman’: Hunter, ‘Discrimination against Women Barristers’, above n 13, 
23. 
 47 The constitution of the barristers’ branch varies considerably across different Australian 
jurisdictions. In Victoria, barristers typically practise from chambers and are placed on a ‘list’ 
administered by a clerk (which is decided by the list committee on application by the barrister to 
the list). Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) prohibit ‘[c]ompulsory 
clerking’ and ‘[c]ompulsory chambers’. Thus barristers in Victoria are not compelled to be on a 
clerk’s list or obtain chambers. However, the Bar Association strongly encourages this practice: 
see The Victorian Bar, About the Bar: Coming to the Bar — Other Information: Financial Com-
mitments <http://www.vicbar.com.au/e.3.4.asp>. In contrast, there are no clerks in Queensland 
and chambers largely serve as convenient accommodation and financial economies of sharing 
secretarial staff. 
 48 Frances Millane, ‘Equal Opportunity and the Briefing Dollar/Pound’ (Speech delivered at the 
International Bar Association’s Second World Women Lawyers’ Conference, London, 30 June 
2003) 3. 
 49 Hunter and McKelvie, above n 4, 68–9. See also Hunter, ‘Discrimination against Women 
Barristers’, above n 13, 10. While there are female senior counsel in most states, they comprise a 
small part of the senior Bar. Therefore, they exert little influence on such statistics, and possibly 
in shaping the culture of the senior Bar. Rhode, for instance, argues for an expansion in the 
number of women in senior legal positions if only to increase their potential influence. However, 
not all senior women will choose to promote or assist junior female barristers: see, eg, Deborah 
L Rhode, ‘Gender and the Profession: The No-Problem Problem’ (2002) 30 Hofstra Law Review 
1001, 1007. 
 50 Hunter, ‘Discrimination against Women Barristers’, above n 13, 11. 
 51 Ibid. 
 52 Ibid 12. 
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these informal factors appear to be gender-neutral, women are less likely to 
benefit from such collegiality in a predominantly male workforce. It has long 
been argued that there is a level of ‘homosociality’ prevailing at the Bar, which 
ensures that gendered characteristics of the workplace are perpetuated.54 The 
‘workplace culture’ affecting women at the Bar is exerted by the broader 
profession (solicitors’ branch). A plethora of literature concerning gender and the 
broader legal profession has noted similar cultures of exclusion through informal 
processes. For instance, Paula Patton described discrimination against women in 
US law firms as not only a result of applying negative stereotypes, but of 
favouring various attributes that are classically associated with or only achiev-
able by men. She noted that ‘legal careers … [are] shaped by and for the man 
with a family who is “family free”’,55 while the classical attribute of law as 
adversarial is male.56 The matrix of socially enforced responsibility, differing life 
experience and perceptions about women’s attributes and abilities often mean 
that women are not or cannot be considered the ‘best candidate’ for the job. It is 
not surprising then that there is a significant interconnection between sex 
discrimination across the two branches of the legal profession.57 
Rosabeth Kanter observed that there is a ‘visibility bias’ operating in many 
workplaces where minorities ‘get attention’ by virtue of being different.58 In the 
context of the Bar, a visibility bias operates so that where there is one female 
senior counsel out of 10 on a list of candidates for a brief, this represents a 
sufficient amount to claim that there is no discrimination in briefing practices. 
 
 53 Hunter and McKelvie, above n 4, 67–8. 
 54 See, eg, Rosemary Hunter, Indirect Discrimination in the Workplace (1992) 165, where Hunter 
argues that this is the case in most male-dominated workplaces. The history of the legal profes-
sion in Australia is characterised by these informal exclusion cultures where women, even when 
formally ‘let in’ to the profession, are relegated to ‘fringe dweller’ status: Thornton, Dissonance 
and Distrust, above n 11, 47. For a study of the experiences of the first women lawyers in sev-
eral jurisdictions internationally, see Mary Jane Mossman, The First Women Lawyers: A Com-
parative Study of Gender, Law and the Legal Professions (2006). 
 55 Patton, above n 3, 181. Patton cites Holly English, who argues that many male lawyers do not 
experience the pressures of assuming caring duties for their families (such as child care): see 
Holly English, Gender on Trial: Sexual Stereotypes and Work/Life Balance in the Legal Work-
place (2003) 249–50. 
 56 For a discussion of this argument, see Eleni Skordaki, ‘Glass Slippers and Glass Ceilings: 
Women in the Legal Profession’ (1996) 3 International Journal of the Legal Profession 7. Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow postulates that women may have a ‘different voice’ in legal practice: Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, ‘Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women’s [sic] Lawyering 
Process’ (1985) 1 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 39, drawing on Carol Gilligan, In a Different 
Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (1982). This essay has sparked a large 
amount of debate within feminist scholarship. While there is considerable debate as to the idea 
of ‘women’s voice’ (see, eg, Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law 
(2nd ed, 2002) 1–3), this analysis does highlight the fact that the entrenched traditions in the legal 
profession reflect male interests. For instance, Patton’s article indicates that emotions such as 
yelling and abuse are more acceptable than other feelings such as camaraderie: Patton, 
above n 3, 183. A few recent critiques of the ‘different voice’ theory include Deborah L Rhode, 
‘Feminist Critical Theories’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 617, 624–5, where it is argued that 
difference theory is not only empirically untrue but limiting women to prevailing gender stereo-
types. See also Joan C Williams, ‘Deconstructing Gender’ (1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 797; 
Jeanne L Schroeder, ‘Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the Logic of 
Imagination’ (1991) 70 Texas Law Review 109; Ellen C Dubois et al, ‘Feminist Discourse, Moral 
Values, and the Law — A Conversation’ (1985) 34 Buffalo Law Review 11. 
 57 It is also worth noting that there may be a significant connection in respect of briefing practices 
due to similarly lower numbers of senior female solicitors. A preponderance of senior male 
solicitors is likely to have a profound impact on the briefing cultures of any firm. 
 58 Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (1st ed, 1977) 210. 
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Sharon Bolton and Daniel Muzio comment that such perceptions arise when 
there are well publicised successes.59 However, academics and legal profession-
als have described women’s experience in the practice of law as often marked by 
a ‘double bind’ required by a culture of conformity: female lawyers are either 
understood as ‘token successes’ or ‘honorary men’, or they are derided for being 
unfeminine in adopting ‘masculine’ characteristics of ambition and aggression.60 
The ‘othering’ of women is achieved by distancing them from the supposedly 
neutral attributes of an ideal advocate. As Thornton claims, ‘[o]therness has been 
effectively constructed as though it were a personal peccadillo that compromises 
the claimed universality and neutrality of the public sphere’.61 In other words, 
the ‘cultural capital’62 in the legal profession is male. 
Finally, Hunter and McKelvie’s report noted that client preference played a 
part in briefing practices. They contended that, in most cases, the will of the 
client was observed by the solicitor even when this amounted to sheer prejudice 
on the basis of gender.63 In the UK, Lesley Holland and Lynne Spencer note a 
similar influence in unequal briefing practices and point out that, while the most 
blatant instances would be unlawful, they are seldom challenged.64 
Hunter and McKelvie’s report, therefore, identified a broad range of factors 
affecting the Bar. The culture of the Bar, practices inside law firms and their 
relationship with the Bar, and client choice were all identified as having a 
substantial impact on the working lives of female barristers. The challenge in 
responding to these findings was to devise strategies that addressed these 
different influences. The MBP is the primary regulatory response to the Hunter 
 
 59 For instance, Bolton and Muzio report that the rate of women receiving practising certificates in 
the UK has increased by 850 per cent in the last 25 years (while in the same period men being 
granted practising certificates increased by only 15 per cent). Women now account for approxi-
mately 40 per cent of the ‘professional headcount’ in the UK: Bolton and Muzio, above n 22, 48. 
 60 The prevalence of these stereotypes in legal professions across the world is described in essays 
contained in Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw (eds), Women in the World’s Legal Professions 
(2003): see, eg, Rhode, ‘Gender and the Profession’, above n 5, 11; Hunter, ‘Women Barristers 
and Gender Difference’, above n 18, 105; Hilary Sommerlad, ‘Can Women Lawyer Differently? 
A Perspective from the UK’ in Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw (eds), Women in the World’s 
Legal Professions (2003) 191, 199; Ulrike Schultz, ‘Women Lawyers in Germany — Perception 
and Construction of Femininity’ in Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw (eds), Women in the World’s 
Legal Professions (2003) 295, 308. See also Ann Bartow, ‘Some Dumb Girl Syndrome: Chal-
lenging and Subverting Destructive Stereotypes of Female Attorneys’ (2005) 11 William and 
Mary Journal of Women and the Law 221. 
 61 Thornton, Dissonance and Distrust, above n 11, 25. 
 62 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Richard Nice trans, first published 1980, 1990 ed)  
69–70 [trans of: Le sens pratique]. Bourdieu’s concept of ‘cultural capital’ is defined as ‘a per-
manent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and 
thinking’: at 70. 
 63 Hunter and McKelvie, above n 4, 89–93. This report also noted the role of clerks in suggesting 
barristers for ‘floating work’ as a factor: at 83–5. See also Hunter, ‘Discrimination against 
Women Barristers’, above n 13, 15–17. Note also that there have been several studies of the 
relationship between clients and lawyers with regard to testing gendered preferences: see, eg, 
Bryna Bogoch, ‘Gendered Lawyering: Difference and Dominance in Lawyer–Client Interaction’ 
(1997) 31 Law and Society Review 677. 
 64 Holland and Spencer, above n 7, 10. In Australia, s 22(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 
(Cth) prescribes that it is unlawful for those providing ‘services’ (defined in s 4 as including ‘the 
kind provided by members of any profession or trade’) to discriminate against another person on 
the grounds of that other person’s sex. Thus, lawyers must not unlawfully discriminate against 
their clients. However, this Act does not contain reciprocal provisions which apply to those 
receiving such services (clients). 
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and McKelvie report.65 However, Hunter notes that while the policy response 
was appropriately focused to ‘tackle the shortcomings of the [solicitors’] branch 
of the profession’, it did not deal with other aspects of the report, which identi-
fied discriminatory cultures and practices of the Bar itself.66 To this criticism, it 
is added that the MBP neither adequately addresses the effect of the  
lawyer–client relationship on briefing practices nor contains clear and specific 
objectives. 
I I I   THE LAW COUNCIL OF  AUSTRALIA’S  MODEL EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY BRIEFING POLICY 
Hunter and McKelvie made a number of recommendations devoted to ‘Brief-
ing Practices and Prejudices’ because their analysis made it clear that briefing 
practices were a major contributor to disadvantage experienced by women at the 
Bar. Many of the recommendations were educationally focused, including: that 
Queen’s Counsels and Senior Counsels look for appropriate junior counsel and 
that the Law Institute of Victoria encourage solicitors to do the same;67 that the 
Bar produce a catalogue of women barristers and encourage solicitors to identify 
women working in relevant areas of law;68 that solicitors be encouraged to 
review who they brief and evaluate what proportion of those regularly briefed 
are women;69 and that clerks’ lists strive for proportionate representation of 
women at various levels and maintain records of briefs received by the barristers 
on their lists according to gender.70 The report also offered more aspirational 
recommendations which underpin the MBP, such as urging efforts to remove 
double standards and other sexually discriminatory practices in briefing,71 and 
observing that the best interests of clients are served by choosing the best 
barrister without prejudice as to gender.72 
In 2000, the Victorian Bar Council drafted and adopted a model briefing policy 
which set out nine principles for equality in briefing based closely on the Hunter 
and McKelvie recommendations.73 This produced an immediate response in 
Victoria and across the country.74 For instance, shortly afterwards, the Western 
Australian Bar Association and Law Society adopted a similar policy, and the 
New South Wales Bar Council adopted a version of the policy in 2003. The 
 
 65 The report also recommended that the state and territory Bar associations establish female 
barristers’ lists to assist in the identification of appropriate female counsel: Hunter and McKel-
vie, above n 4, 78. These lists are available in many states. 
 66 Hunter, ‘Discrimination against Women Barristers’, above n 13, 36. 
 67 Hunter and McKelvie, above n 4, 77. 
 68 Ibid 78. 
 69 Ibid 80. 
 70 Ibid 89. 
 71 Ibid 78. 
 72 Ibid 93. 
 73 Victorian Bar Council, Equality of Opportunity Model Briefing Policy (2000). 
 74 The Women Barristers’ Directory was also established as a subcategory of the listings of 
barristers in Victoria (on the Victorian Bar’s website <http://www.vicbar.com.au>). This initia-
tive was recommended to increase the visibility of female barristers. It has been copied by most 
Bar associations across the country. The Victorian Bar Council also formed a committee to 
continually review this area, conduct a number of workshops and engage in discussions with the 
private sector: Chris Merritt, ‘More Briefs for Female Lawyers’, The Australian Financial Re-
view (Melbourne), 29 August 2003, 3. 
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report and the Victorian policy encouraged Australian Women Lawyers to 
establish a Taskforce on Briefing Practices in May 2003, which ultimately led to 
the production of the Gender Appearance Survey. The Law Council of Australia 
adopted the Victorian policy in 2003, despite noting that the widespread en-
dorsement and adoption of the policy by the profession had not yet generated 
any fundamental change in basic norms prevailing within the legal profession.75 
The results of the Gender Appearance Survey in 2006 support these comments. 
The issue was considered at the November 2003 Standing Committee of At-
torneys-General meeting, which resulted in the Law Council of Australia being 
charged with developing a national model policy suitable for adoption by the 
government and private legal profession. The MBP, which was adopted on 20 
March 2004, is described as ‘a common set of aspirational principles’,76 possibly 
because it is proposed for voluntary adoption by clients and legal practitioners. 
The MBP provides: 
In selecting counsel, all reasonable endeavours should be made to: 
(a) identify female counsel in the relevant practice area; … and 
(b) genuinely consider engaging such counsel; … and 
(c) regularly monitor and review the engagement of female counsel; … and 
(d) periodically report on the nature and rate of engagement of female coun-
sel …77 
The MBP broadly retains the primary focus of the original policy to educate 
those briefing and to avoid direct discrimination against female counsel, 
contained in the requirement to ‘genuinely consider engaging’ female counsel.78 
However, it can also be understood as the first step away from the detailed 
findings of the Hunter and McKelvie report. It removed several specifically 
targeted responses to areas of functional discrimination in briefing practices, 
such as promoting opportunities for junior female barristers.79 Furthermore, it 
placed the requirement for counsel to identify female counsel when asked for 
recommendations as a note to the policy. There are no measures ostensibly aimed 
at curbing the predominance of selection by fraternal networks. The third level 
of influence on briefing practices — the client — has also been omitted from the 
MBP. A section entitled ‘Application of the Policy’, while ‘acknowledging’ that 
 
 75 Law Council of Australia, 2010: A Discussion Paper — Challenges for the Legal Profession 
(2001) 134. 
 76 MBP, above n 8. 
 77 Ibid 2. The MBP (at 2–3) contains guidance notes to assist in implementing the policy such as: 
A genuine consideration would have regard to the skills and competency of counsel, regard-
less of gender and should avoid inappropriate assumptions about the capacities and aptitude of 
female and male counsel. Where there are equally capable male and female counsel available, 
arbitrary and prejudicial factors should not operate to exclude the engagement of female coun-
sel. … 
The objective of reviewing, monitoring and then reporting to clients and to Bar Associations 
or Law Societies on the nature and rate of engagement is that female counsel be briefed at no 
less than the prevailing percentage of female counsel in the relevant practice area. … The re-
view and periodic report should have regard to the success or otherwise of the implementation 
of an equitable briefing policy, and should initiate steps to redress inequity where it is identi-
fied. 
 78 Ibid 2. 
 79 The analysis here is comparing the MBP to the earlier model briefing policy adopted by the 
Victorian Bar Council. 
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‘legal practitioners exercise significant influence’ in selecting counsel,80 
provides no requirement that efforts be made to remove client prejudice within 
the MBP.81 
Finally, and of more concern, specific objectives have been replaced by the 
broader ideal of ‘progression of women in the law’ (in ‘Objectives of the 
Policy’).82 While this is certainly the overarching goal, the Hunter and McKelvie 
report was significant for its identification of specific objectives for achieving 
this broader goal. Indeed, the ‘Objectives of the Policy’ section prioritises the 
maximisation of ‘choices for legal practitioners and their clients’ and optimisa-
tion of ‘opportunities for practice development of all counsel’.83 The MBP, 
therefore, appears to be less focused on its initial objective of promoting women 
at the Bar. There is a reference in the ‘Notes to Assist in Implementing the 
Policy’ which explains the requirement of reporting on the rate and nature of 
briefs as intended to ensure that ‘female counsel be briefed at no less than the 
prevailing percentage of female counsel in the relevant practice area’.84 It is 
unfortunate that this is left to a note rather than forming part of the body of the 
policy, as it is the only part of the MBP which refers to a defined and practical 
objective. 
The previous Part of this article discussed in detail the findings and recom-
mendations of the Hunter and McKelvie report in order to explain the basis of 
the MBP. The report traced the various ways in which women experience 
discrimination in briefing practices. It is acknowledged that the MBP takes a 
first step by educating ‘briefers’ of the availability of female counsel, by 
prohibiting direct discrimination and by establishing a process to evaluate 
whether the policy has resulted in any change (that is, whether more women are 
being briefed). This is a valuable beginning. However, it is contended that the 
MBP in its current form is unlikely to create any substantive change within 
cultures of briefing at the Bar or by solicitors because it does not question the 
basis by which counsel are selected. It is argued that the MBP needs to be more 
than recommendatory. It should be attended by ‘harder’ requirements which 
demand more transparency in the process of briefing barristers, and mandate 
certain outcomes, at least, in the short-term. 
In order to make this point, this article addresses the preliminary question of 
whether this weaker version was the product of prevailing assumptions about 
appropriate policymaking. The reduction of the goals of the MBP to statistical 
equality and removing direct discrimination applies a formal rather than substan-
tive idea of equality of opportunity. It is argued that the MBP is focused on 
achieving procedural fairness and hence is in line with the prevailing regulatory 
approach of achieving equality of opportunity — prohibiting individual instances 
of discrimination rather than ensuring equality of result. 
 
 80 MBP, above n 8, 2. 
 81 Interestingly, the ‘Application of the Policy’ section requires that barristers and clerks put 
forward names of female barristers when consulted: ibid. This aspect of the MBP, while it ap-
pears not to be part of the provisions to be implemented, seems to take a tougher approach by 
requiring that female counsel be considered in every case. 
 82 Ibid. 
 83 Ibid. 
 84 Ibid 3. 
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Nevertheless, it is also contended that if we retain even the limited goal of 
statistical equality (women should be briefed equally in proportion to their 
numbers at the Bar), this provides a strong justification for implementing more 
radical forms of policy to achieve this result. While the prevailing attitude to 
appropriate equality policy will be difficult to displace, this is a rare opportunity 
to put forward strong arguments for ‘hard’ affirmative action policy which 
institutes real institutional change.85 In this case, there is general consensus that 
women at the Bar are a disadvantaged group and that there is a legitimate need to 
take action to remedy this situation. We have identified a specific area (briefing 
practices) causing widespread disadvantage to women at the Bar. The difficult 
question then is: ‘how far should society go in trying to redress any imbalances 
that have occurred?’86 It is argued that appropriately designed and implemented 
affirmative action policy is more likely to remove specified aspects of discrimi-
nation. 
As an underlying basis for any amendment to the MBP, this article contends 
that the MBP in its current form can be characterised as affirmative action. 
However, there remains strident opposition to such a description. As Aileen 
McHarg and Donald Nicolson argue, there is a ‘gap between perception and 
reality’ in designing such policy, and certain misconceptions ‘have a real hold 
and rhetorical power.’87 The next Part, therefore, examines the formulation and 
discursive framing of the MBP. 
IV  DEFINING THE MBP — CONSTRUCTIONS OF  MERIT AND 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
The MBP has been widely adopted by most Bar associations, law societies and 
the Victorian and federal governments.88 Professional and governmental bodies, 
when adopting and promoting the MBP, presented a united description of the 
policy. For instance, when adopting the MBP the Victorian Bar Council stated 
that it was 
not an affirmative action or quota policy. It advocates, as part of the briefing 
process, that reasonable endeavours be made to identify and genuinely consider 
appropriate women barristers as suitable for briefing in a particular case and for 
a particular client.89 
 
 85 Ibid. Indeed, the notes in the MBP contemplate that those implementing the policy may assess 
its effectiveness and determine what further initiatives are needed. 
 86 Noor Bloomer, ‘Outgoing President’s Report’ [July 2006] Themis 8. This question applies 
beyond reforms by the legal profession alone. While this article is concerned with discussion of 
the MBP as a regulatory initiative of the profession, it is suggested that this analysis has broader 
application. However, while the Victorian and federal governments have adopted versions of the 
MBP, neither institution has approached regulation this way. 
 87 Aileen McHarg and Donald Nicolson, ‘Justifying Affirmative Action: Perception and Reality’ 
(2006) 33 Journal of Law and Society 1, 3. 
 88 While it is not within the scope of this article to discuss the implementation of the policy by 
these governments, it is noted that adoption has taken very different forms. For instance, while 
the Victorian adoption of the policy appears interested, and invested, in ensuring that it creates 
change and in measuring its success, the federal government’s implementation of the MBP does 
not appear to be attended by the same interests. Implementation of the MBP is the subject of a 
companion article that also refers to qualitative research in the area currently being undertaken. 
 89 Anthony Howard, Report of Meeting of the Victorian Bar Council Held on 1 April 2004 (2004) 
2–3. 
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The Law Council of Australia has explained that ‘[t]his means that where there 
is equally capable male and female counsel available, prejudice should not be a 
factor in excluding a female barrister or advocate’.90 The federal government’s 
Review of the Legal Services Directions Issues Paper (‘Issues Paper’)91 clearly 
indicated that the only appropriate regulatory principle for fair briefing was on 
‘merit’. The Issues Paper contrasted this ‘principle’ with the dangers of any form 
of affirmative action policy:92 
The introduction of quotas is not supported. Quotas are regarded as an ineffec-
tive tool for achieving progress in this area, mainly because they generate op-
position to the policy they are supposed to promote, rather than building sup-
port for that policy. Merit should remain the essential criterion for allocating 
the Commonwealth’s legal work and quotas are in conflict with this principle.93 
Thus the predominance of ‘merit’ is underscored as the only legitimate politi-
cal, philosophical and moral principle for regulation. It is contrasted with 
affirmative action as an extreme example of radical action — the imposition of 
quotas. The tension is contained in how the two concepts are defined. Merit is 
understood as a ‘value neutral’ selection process. It fulfils the liberal ideals of 
individualism and rationality which are embedded in our legal discourse by 
postulating an objective criterion for finding the best (and therefore the most 
worthy) candidate. Therefore, as Thornton’s work has long argued, merit has 
continued to hold significant power: 
Devoid of any social context, [merit] is perceived as an apolitical criterion of 
personal worth. A mystique of neutrality has nevertheless endowed the concept 
with considerable political significance and moral persuasiveness when it is in-
voked to justify, to criticise, or to constrain, any policy proposals. Merit, so de-
fined, has political form that is clearly unrelated to the reality of its application 
as an ‘apolitical’ selection criterion.94 
 
 90 Law Council of Australia, ‘Law Council Sets Standards for Equal Opportunity in the Legal 
Profession’ (Press Release, 20 March 2004) <http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/read/2004/ 
2393172803.html>. 
 91 Legal Services and Native Title Division, Attorney-General’s Department, Review of the Legal 
Services Directions Issues Paper (2004) <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/ 
VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF)~1+Review+of+issues+paper.pdf/$file/1+Re
view+of+issues+paper.pdf>. 
 92 However, it also canvassed various methods for adoption of and compliance with the MBP by 
considering equal opportunity briefing polices in other jurisdictions. For instance, the Issues 
Paper cited ministerial approval for ‘the principle that government entities should engage legal 
services with regard to equality of opportunity’ and that government agencies and external legal 
service providers demonstrate compliance with the policy by completing an annual checklist: 
ibid 21. This checklist was annexed to the Issues Paper: at 25. As the Law Council of Australia 
noted in its submission, this reference is actually incorrect: Law Council of Australia, Office of 
Legal Services Coordination Review of Legal Services Directions: Law Council of Australia 
Comments — Response to the Issues Paper Published by the Legal Services and Native Title 
Division of the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department (2004) 2. Nevertheless, the 
Victorian government does require reporting on all briefing with reference to gender (using the 
Briefing Barristers Survey), and it publishes the results: see Office of Government Legal Ser-
vices, Department of Justice, Victorian Government, Barristers Briefing Report 2006–2007 
(2007) <http://www.justice.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/DOJ+Internet/resources/file/eb10c508 
bcaee7b/VictorianGovernmentBarristersBriefingReport200607.pdf>. 
 93 Issues Paper, above n 91, 22. 
 94 Margaret Thornton, ‘Affirmative Action, Merit and the Liberal State’ (1985) 2 Australian 
Journal of Law and Society 28, 29. 
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In contrast, affirmative action is ‘understood as describing a range of policies 
which contemplate the possibility of the selection of a less qualified over a more 
qualified candidate on the basis of their membership of an under-represented 
target group’.95 Australian legislation in the area is characterised by the same 
approach. For instance, Thornton describes the amendment to the Affirmative 
Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 (Cth) to rename it the Equal 
Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 1999 (Cth) (‘EOWW Act’) as 
carefully deleting all reference to ‘forward estimates’ or ‘objectives’ because of 
the fear of quotas, which is code for appointing ‘unqualified’ women without 
regard to the merit principle.96 
This Part questions whether either concept should necessarily be understood in 
this way. The above characterisation of affirmative action ignores all alternative 
objectives and principles that may underpin such policies, such as diversity and 
distributive justice. It is entirely defined in relation to its contravention of 
principles of merit and even equality. Indeed, it suggests that it operates as a 
form of discrimination. This explanation of affirmative action is why it is often 
also termed ‘preferential treatment’ or ‘reverse discrimination’. The ideal of 
merit is located as a subset of the dominant ideology of liberalism with the core 
value of individual autonomy. John Stuart Mill reasoned that there was a 
utilitarian good in removing regulatory intervention and allowing individuals to 
compete on their merits, thereby creating a more equal and just society.97 While 
neo-liberal philosophy has more recently accepted that not all members of 
society can attain equality in an unregulated, market-driven society, there 
remains a ‘general liberal suspicion of prioritising equality over freedom’.98 A 
regulatory approach that impinges on freedom to compete on merit is therefore 
suspect, obscuring the range of other rationales for such an approach. 
In Australia, all legislative mention of affirmative action has been erased and 
largely replaced by phrases such as ‘equal opportunity’ or ‘merit’. The renamed 
EOWW Act99 includes the ‘object’ to ‘promote the principle that employment for 
women should be dealt with on the basis of merit’.100 Thus, affirmative action is 
chiefly rejected because of its positioning in a dichotomous relationship with 
merit. However, as the next Part argues, merit as a neutral, objective and isolated 
concept is highly questionable. There is now a chorus of commentators pointing 
 
 95 Kate Malleson, ‘Rethinking the Merit Principle in Judicial Selection’ (2006) 33 Journal of Law 
and Society 126, 127. While Malleson is concerned in her article with judicial selection, her 
useful definition of affirmative action is applicable more broadly. 
 96 Margaret Thornton, ‘EEO in a Neo-Liberal Climate’ (2001) 6 Journal of Interdisciplinary 
Gender Studies 77, 92. See also Barbara Pocock’s discussion in Barbara Pocock, ‘Equal Pay 
Thirty Years On: The Policy and the Practice’ (1999) 32 Australian Economic Review 279, 281. 
 97 John Stuart Mill, ‘The Subjection of Women’ in Alice S Rossi (ed), Essays on Sex Equality: 
John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill (1970) 123. 
 98 Marion Maddox, ‘Affirmative Action: Liberal Accommodation or Radical Trojan Horse’  
(1998–99) 14 Australian Journal of Law and Society 1, 8. 
 99 Section 8(1) of the Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 (Cth) imposed 
an eight step plan for the implementation of an affirmative action programme which included: 
issuing a policy statement in accordance with affirmative action objectives; data collection to 
assess the level of women employed in the organisation; setting clear objectives for the future; 
and monitoring achievements. No quotas were required to be imposed and the only sanction for 
failing to comply with its provisions was naming in Parliament. 
100 EOWW Act s 2A. 
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to ‘merit’ as an inherently subjective concept.101 They also point to the use of 
merit as a camouflage for discriminatory practices. Carol Bacchi argues that the 
idea of ‘merit’ is used to reinforce ‘informal cultural values’, mask ‘contradic-
tory interests and preserve existing unequal power relations’.102 Thornton 
similarly criticises the looseness of the conceptual basis of merit that ‘permits 
and legitimates discriminatory practices’.103 Merit is not a neutral and objective 
factor in selecting counsel. As a result, the MBP, as a reflection of the merit 
principle, should be understood as an add-on to existing practices rather than a 
mechanism of institutional change. While the MBP has been lauded as a regula-
tory instrument to institute cultural change, the preservation of institutional 
status quo, in word and deed, may in fact mask informal discriminatory prac-
tices. 
Further, it is argued that once the dichotomous relationship between merit and 
affirmative action is rejected, the social or moral justificatory power of 
merit-based selection is weakened and we are left searching for an underlying 
rationale. 
V  WHAT IS  MEANT BY SELECTION ON ‘MERIT’? 
Kate Malleson describes what she calls the common ‘maximalist’ approach of 
selection on merit, which assumes that in any situation the best candidate for the 
job can be easily identified based on a set of objective criteria.104 However, as 
she says of judicial selection, briefing counsel is rarely so easy. The qualitative 
work described earlier105 identified a wide range of informal and value-laden 
criteria which are often employed to identify the ‘best candidate’. The criteria are 
rarely articulated and often unconscious, and may vary depending on the area of 
law, the type of brief (in adversarial cases, for instance, a natural inclination for a 
‘desk-thumping’ man may prevail; in other circumstances, ‘senior’ may be 
synonymous with ‘male’) and the client (assumptions about the sex, race or other 
background of the client may inform selection). While it is not suggested that 
there should be any criterion which is inappropriate (except those based on 
prejudice or malice), the merit principle is often invoked to shroud in mystery 
the selection process and thus the criteria used to select counsel. In many cases, 
there may not only be several barristers who could perform the brief equally 
well, but may do so in very diverse ways. However, far from weighing different 
talents, briefs are most commonly awarded on the basis of predetermined 
qualities of a ‘good advocate’ or simply a like person (a man). Those who 
possess dominant cultural capital — male barristers and those briefing them — 
 
101 For instance, Christopher McCrudden suggests that the meaning of merit is so contested that it is 
hardly worth using the term at all: Christopher McCrudden, ‘Merit Principles’ (1998) 18 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 543, 543–4. 
102 Carol Bacchi, ‘The Brick Wall: Why So Few Women Become Senior Academics’ (1993) 36 
Australian Universities’ Review 36, 39, citing Albertine Veldman, ‘“The Rule of Power”: The 
Implementation of Equal Employment Opportunity Law in a Corporate Setting’ (1991) 12 Dutch 
and Belgian Law and Society Journal 69, 76. 
103 Margaret Thornton, The Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Legislation in Australia (1990) 
19. 
104 Malleson, above n 95, 128. 
105 Young, above n 4; Hunter and McKelvie, above n 4. 
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wield what Pierre Bourdieu describes as ‘symbolic mastery’106 by which they 
can recreate and manipulate briefing culture. 
A key aspect of the merit principle is not only that a clear, neutral and objec-
tive set of selection criteria can and should be applied in each instance, but also 
that this must be derived solely on the basis of the function to be performed 
rather than broader concerns such as promoting a disadvantaged group. The 
MBP makes a first, uncontroversial step in providing that extrinsic considera-
tions of background and other prejudicial concerns must be excised from 
selection processes. It is not contested that this aspect of selection on ‘merit’ 
should be observed. In this sense, the MBP extends the reach of 
anti-discrimination statutes to briefing barristers. While this is a laudable 
addition to the regulatory regime, this aspect of the MBP tells a briefer little 
about how to undertake the briefing process or, more specifically, what selecting 
on merit means. Indeed, it appears to imply that selection of counsel has not been 
on merit. However, this Part argues that a better understanding of the MBP is that 
it is intended to correct individual instances of prejudice rather than to address an 
institutionalised problem of determining what selection on merit entails.107 
It is suggested that not only will there rarely be one best candidate, but that 
merit cannot be ascertained as a clear set of criteria for performance of a brief. 
There are few jobs, particularly in the case of an individual brief, which have a 
definite and finite set of functions to be fulfilled by a person who possesses the 
ability to perform them to a specified degree. Indeed, in many cases, when 
looking at the talents of counsel, the briefer may change their conception of how 
to conduct the case or favour one or other criteria specified for fulfilling the 
brief. While briefers may look for certain broad minimum qualifications such as 
experience, how much experience is attainable will often depend more on the 
available pool of candidates and balancing this against other factors such as the 
hourly rate. Thus, as Malleson observes of judicial appointment, which involves 
a similarly flexible array of qualities in a candidate, ‘there is no possibility of 
disengaging the construction of merit from the question of who might be 
appointed’.108 It follows that in each case, the question of merit is intimately 
connected with the pool of candidates. This is not necessarily objectionable, but 
raises grave doubts as to any neutral and objective understanding of merit. What 
then becomes crucial is how we construct merit in each case, and understanding 
that it is a process of preference for one candidate over another. The MBP begins 
this process by prohibiting certain types of preference formation based on lack of 
awareness of any female candidates and direct prejudice. The next step is not to 
set out a prescriptive (or proscriptive) method for selecting counsel, but rather to 
make transparent how merit is determined in each case. For instance, this could 
be done by listing the candidates considered and providing an explanation of 
why one person from the list was or was not selected. The ‘visibility bias’ 
described by Kanter may thereby become apparent. Simply short-listing a female 
 
106 See also Sommerlad’s useful discussion of Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ as an internalised cultural 
practice: Hilary Sommerlad, ‘Researching and Theorizing the Processes of Professional Identity 
Formation’ (2007) 34 Journal of Law and Society 190. 
107 It is conceded here that the MBP does address the process of finding candidates for a brief. 
Rather the argument concerns the second step of ‘genuinely considering’ female counsel when 
making a decision as to whom to award the brief. 
108 Malleson, above n 95, 137. 
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barrister may not be sufficient where the briefing process is weighed against her. 
Similarly, where there are several female barristers who are eligible for the brief, 
consideration of only one (to make up the numbers) will be insufficient. 
One preliminary observation which follows from a more subjective notion of 
selection of counsel is that it is unlikely the MBP in its current form will achieve 
even the limited objectives it sets out (equality for women in the number and 
nature of briefs they receive proportional to their professional representation). 
While the MBP requires review and reporting on the nature and rate of appoint-
ment of female counsel, the undefined process of selection in each case provides 
an excuse for a lack of progress in achieving formal equality. In short, it is hard 
to see how it is enforceable even where the policy takes a mandatory form.109 
The implication when the MBP fails to achieve results is that it is the fault of 
women at the Bar — they are simply not meritorious enough to receive briefs.110 
If we understand the MBP to be concerned with achieving equality of process 
rather than result (women should be equally able to compete for briefs rather 
than actually ensuring that they receive them), the form of the MBP may be 
insufficient. The process of briefing does not merely consist of being placed on a 
list and ‘genuinely considered’ — it also encompasses how this consideration is 
undertaken. 
The larger point here is not to postulate a perfect solution, but rather to prob-
lematise the contention that merit is neutral and objective. In the context of 
current discriminatory selection processes, it is contended that the terminology 
of merit should be dispensed with, or at least what is meant by it should be 
described.111 More significantly, when merit loses its power to elevate a process 
beyond question and thus its social or moral weight, it is no longer a prima facie 
basis on which to reject affirmative action policies. In order to explain this, this 
Part examines several arguments based on the ‘merit principle’ put forward by 
Donald Nicolson in the context of briefing.112 These arguments have long been 
employed to argue against affirmative action policies. 
First, Nicolson considers the argument that ‘candidates adjudged to be the best 
have a moral right or claim to the relevant position’.113 He rejects this argument 
on the ground that the ‘best’ candidate is rarely selected on past performance and 
that even if this were true, few would say that someone with more aptitude is 
morally superior. In the case of awarding briefs, this process may differ from 
selection for academic places, recruitment or promotion. Past performance is 
 
109 An example of such a mandatory form is the adoption of the MBP by the Victorian government. 
This early adoption provides some indications of the ‘success’ achieved in implementing the 
MBP, where there was an increase in briefs awarded to female barristers by the government: see 
Office of Government Legal Services, above n 92. 
110 For a similar argument against anti-discrimination policies, see Anne Game, ‘Affirmative 
Action: Liberal Rationality or Challenge to Patriarchy?’ (1984) Legal Service Bulletin 253. 
Admittedly, women at the Bar may also be unavailable or unwilling to take on many cases. The 
argument here is that where we leave undisturbed the rationale that (unexamined) merit is the 
only valid method of selection of counsel, then such initiatives may attract this argument. 
111 For instance, Nicolson is scathing of ‘merit’ as a term used to reject affirmative action as he 
notes the ‘irony, if not the hypocrisy, of lawyers trumpeting a principle which so many continue 
to disregard, not to mention the bigotry of the assumption that those from previously excluded 
groups are inherently inferior’: Donald Nicolson, ‘Affirmative Action in the Legal Profession’ 
(2006) 33 Journal of Law and Society 109, 115. 
112 These arguments are not new, but rather Nicolson’s article usefully summarises them: ibid. 
113 Ibid 116. 
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often crucial and the brief may require almost identical application of skills, 
intellect and other talents as demonstrated in previous cases. Nevertheless, a 
moral argument is weak when one frames this in distributive justice or even 
substantive equality terms. In many cases, the talent may not be natural ability, 
but rather experience (being able to obtain briefs), types of education (such as 
pupillage at the Bar) and learned skills (such as style of arguing). A woman, 
subject to a complex array of discriminatory factors within the culture of the Bar, 
may find such skills, experience and education difficult to establish, as has 
already been discussed. If the stated goal is equality of opportunity, promoting 
women is arguably a moral good that has some claim to be weighed alongside 
individual natural talent. This form of merit-based argument seeks to accrue 
benefit only to individual barristers. 
Nicolson also postulates a slightly different claim that the best candidate has a 
‘legitimate expectation, rather than a moral claim, to the position’.114 This is a 
common contention of those opposed to affirmative action, who often use this 
claim as a basis to characterise affirmative action as discriminating against those 
outside the target group. Again, Nicolson claims that this is a suspect assertion. If 
an affirmative action program is well publicised and pre-advised, then the 
reduction of opportunities in certain cases is hardly a strong cause for complaint. 
In the case of receiving briefs, it is spurious that any one barrister has a legiti-
mate expectation to receive any brief. Rather, this argument shifts without any 
basis the free right of a barrister to compete for briefs to a formal right to obtain 
that brief. 
The strongest argument in support of merit is that professional standards are 
best served by recruiting the ‘best’ candidates. In the case of briefing, it has 
already been argued that the best candidate is generally a subjective choice and 
that there is rarely a single person best suited for the case. While it is conceded 
that merit has some role to play in defining a minimum level of qualification, in 
many cases there will be a female barrister able to perform the minimum 
requirements, which ought to produce something approaching equality of 
opportunity at the Bar. This, as has been described in detail in this Part, is not the 
case. Therefore, an argument that selection on an undefined value of merit is 
required to ensure professional standards is not convincing. 
However, if we understand professional standards to mean the interests of the 
client, then this is a more complex consideration. As a matter of contract (the 
retainer between solicitor and client), in equity (such as fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and trust),115 and under statute,116 acting against the interests of the client 
will be a breach of a lawyer’s duties. Any consideration of interests other than 
the client’s, such as those of female barristers, may contravene these strict duties 
 
114 Ibid 117. 
115 See generally Carter v Palmer (1842) 8 Cl & F 657; 8 ER 256; Hospital Products Ltd v United 
States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41. 
116 Each state and territory except South Australia has enacted a legal profession Act, the provisions 
of which are largely uniform in this area: see Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT); Legal Profes-
sion Act 2004 (NSW); Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld); Legal 
Profession Act 2007 (Tas); Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic); Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA). 
The Legal Profession Bill 2007 (SA) has lapsed. Furthermore, barristers’ rules and solicitors’ 
rules promulgated by professional bodies also require the observance of strict duties of client 
confidentiality, care and loyalty. A breach of such duties attracts severe professional sanction: 
see, eg, Mellifont v Queensland Law Society Inc [1981] Qd R 17. 
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of loyalty and care.117 It follows that a solicitor must in every case brief a 
barrister on the basis of the interests of the client alone. This requires selecting 
the most meritorious counsel for the case. However, again, this cannot be 
reduced to a predetermined formula. While each client desires the best barrister 
in town, the client’s case or budget may not allow for briefing a high priced 
senior counsel. Duties to the client are not breached when lesser counsel, who 
reaches minimum qualifications to perform the case, is briefed. Equally, while 
the client may prefer a type of counsel (such as a man), it does not follow that 
this will be the best counsel. There is some discretion, indeed obligation, under 
rules governing solicitors and barristers in most states to exercise independent 
forensic judgement.118 Where a client displays a prejudice, there is no legal 
prohibition on the solicitor pointing out that this is a poor method for selection of 
counsel. While there is no clear professional ethical regulation which mandates 
appointment of appropriate counsel, allowing the client to choose poorly may 
constitute a substandard level of care. In any case, recourse to client prejudice is 
unwarranted in most cases because clients will be entirely guided by their 
solicitors in selection of counsel. Therefore, there appears to be nothing prohibit-
ing either the solicitor seeking out available and eligible female counsel for all 
briefs, nor suggesting them to their clients. 
The concern of private practice that their clients expect appointment of the 
most effective counsel is not inconsistent with a more directed, and even 
coercive, MBP. Only where we can point to objective and efficient methods of 
evaluating merit can we make a real claim as to the appropriateness of existing 
briefing practices. An alternative to the MBP, which was present in the early 
Victorian version of the policy, is to require counsel or solicitors to recommend 
female barristers and to make real efforts to persuade clients not to bring any 
prejudices to bear. A directed or dynamic understanding of merit might apply 
such that the legal practitioner is required to assess the available counsel not on 
presupposed abilities of a generic best advocate but on one best suited to the 
 
117 It is conceded that this duty may be stated too strongly. Consideration of other interests than that 
of the client’s may be permissible or demanded. For instance, professional ethical regulation and 
common law in each jurisdiction elevates duties to the court (and the lawyer’s role as officer of 
the court) above their duties to the client when a conflict in duties arises. Furthermore, profes-
sional ethical regulation encompasses equitable principles, which strictly prohibit the lawyer 
from preferring or even promoting their own interests when undertaking legal work: see, eg, 
Law Institute of Victoria Ltd, Professional Conduct and Practice Rules (2005) rr 9–13. How-
ever, there are no express prohibitions on the consideration of other interests while undertaking 
legal work, except where this will clearly constitute substandard work for the client. Unlike 
directors’ duties, lawyers’ duties are typically provided as proscriptive rather than prescriptive. 
Thus, there is considerable discussion in the field of legal ethics which debates the role of a 
lawyer in this area: see, eg, the arguments of moral activist theorist, David Luban: David Luban, 
‘The Adversary System Excuse’ in David Luban (ed), The Good Lawyer: Lawyers’ Roles and 
Lawyers’ Ethics (1983) 83. 
118 See, eg, The Victorian Bar Inc, Practice Rules: Rules of Conduct and Compulsory Continuing 
Legal Education Rules (2005) r 16, which provides: 
 A barrister must not act as the mere mouthpiece of the client or of the instructing solicitor 
and must exercise the forensic judgments called for during the case independently, after 
appropriate consideration of the client’s and the instructing solicitor’s desires where prac-
ticable. 
  Similarly, r 17 provides that there is no breach of duty to the client should the barrister exercise 
such ‘forensic judgment’ and conduct the case contrary to client instructions in certain circum-
stances. These rules are replicated in rr 13.1 and 13.2 of the Law Institute of Victoria Ltd, Pro-
fessional Conduct and Practice Rules (2005). This is also imposed in contract and tort by a 
minimum standard of care to be exercised in undertaking legal work. 
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client and their needs with reference to the available pool of candidates. This 
form of ‘care’119 shown to the client may not only assist women to obtain a range 
of briefs, but it may also be entirely consistent with duties to the client. For 
instance, r 12 of the Law Institute of Victoria’s Professional Conduct and 
Practice Rules provides that solicitors must advise clients on a range of matters 
which will assist them to make informed decisions.120 Arguably, advice on 
choice of counsel with reference to the interests of the client’s case would fall 
within these duties. In some cases the client may have interests in supporting 
female counsel.121 
It is conceded that the interests of the client provide a strong argument for 
merit to be paramount in selection of counsel. The imposition of ‘hard’ affirma-
tive action policies that require a quota of female barristers to be appointed may 
be inconsistent with duties to the individual client. Where a client clearly 
expresses a preference for counsel which is based in prejudice, there is no 
exception to the solicitor’s duties to follow client instructions as client prefer-
ence, in this instance, falls outside the scope of anti-discrimination laws. Thus, 
there is no prima facie unlawfulness or prejudice to the administration of justice. 
Similarly, it is conceded that there are strong incentives for lawyers to cater to 
clients’ preferences in order to maintain good relationships. On the other hand, 
where lawyers predicatively suggest a certain type of counsel on this basis, this 
displays a paternalism that may not be in the best interests of the client. The 
argument that all other policy options should be rejected in favour of retaining 
total discretion in the selection of counsel on the basis of an undefined idea of 
merit is questionable. An amended version of the MBP, which includes the 
specific requirement that female counsel be considered in all or most cases or 
that the client be advised on a differing range of talents and how these might be 
useful for the case, does not breach duties to the client and accords with a 
subjective understanding of merit. Additionally, requiring an explanation of why 
apparently eligible women were overlooked in the award of a brief represents 
another strategy to render transparent the selection process. 
In formulating the MBP, merit has not only been defined as objective and 
intrinsically fair, but it has also been discursively located in opposition to all 
other considerations. The implication is that it is unacceptably violated when 
considerations other than those strictly required for the job are also valued. This 
article argues that a value of promoting substantive equality for women at the 
Bar does not necessarily result in selection without regard to any form of 
qualification or ability to perform the job. As discussed above, in many cases 
there will be several barristers able to perform the brief despite possessing 
different qualities. It does not follow that if we favour one barrister on the basis 
of being female that she was not selected on merit. This ‘tie-breaker’ approach is 
 
119 ‘Care’ is used here to link to a larger debate in legal ethics regarding the appropriate relationship 
between lawyer and client. It is one that not only values loyalty and zealousness to the client’s 
cause, but also takes into account a range of other considerations that may affect the client or 
others involved in the case: see, eg, Rhode, ‘Gender and Professional Roles’, above n 42; Nel 
Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education (1st ed, 1984); Men-
kel-Meadow, ‘Portia in a Different Voice’, above n 56. 
120 Law Institute of Victoria Ltd, Professional Conduct and Practice Rules (2005) r 12. 
121 Certain clients may have an interest in promoting diversity or equality as a personal or 
organisational goal. If the client is not made aware of the availability of female counsel, they 
may be unaware that there were suitable female counsel for their matter. 
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also unlikely to breach duties to the client.122 However, the MBP was formed on 
the basis that no such extrinsic consideration is valid. This was not put forward 
as a matter of principle but rather as a discursive tactic of contrasting merit with 
an extreme form of affirmative action (quotas). There was no consideration of 
the spectrum of possibilities between the two. The next Part examines a few of 
the many definitions of affirmative action that have been offered to illustrate this 
point. 
VI  DEFINING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
The MBP was generally viewed as different to any system of quotas for female 
barristers. It was on this basis that a range of policy options for achieving the 
objective of equality for women at the Bar was rejected. However, in contrast, 
affirmative action as policy and law is generally defined in a far more expansive 
way, particularly in the US, which has a long history of implementing such 
policies.123 Affirmative action is properly understood as based in certain ration-
ales and objectives rather than one form of implementation. Reference to quotas 
obscures the intent of such policies, and thus leaves no space for such initiatives 
to be seriously considered as appropriate responses to an identified area of 
disadvantage. 
Since affirmative action has no one definition, it can be understood as any 
policy that recognises and addresses past or present disadvantage of an identified 
group (based on a range of rationales from retributive to distributive justice and 
arguments favouring diversity or social utility). In more practical terms, it ‘is a 
novel mechanism that is designed to change the profile and culture of a work-
place in the interests of women and/or designated groups through the initiation of 
 
122 Nicolson points to two difficulties with this approach. First, this could lead to an 
over-representation of women in briefing which would not be the case for a specified quota or 
target: Nicolson, ‘Affirmative Action in the Legal Profession’, above n 111, 123. However, this 
seems a small concern in the context of the long history of women’s discrimination at the Bar. 
This strategy also seems appropriate in relation to selection of senior counsel where there are 
two equally qualified counsel. Here, the low numbers of senior women at the Bar suggest that, at 
least in the short-term, this would be unlikely to lead to over-representation. Secondly, given that 
subjective and informal methods of selecting counsel are often used, such a policy would simply 
lead to more weight being placed on those very fraternal qualities which we are seeking to 
reduce in order to avoid the policy (arguing that the woman is not an equal): at 123. Without an 
accompanying requirement to identify how candidates are selected and evaluated, this form of 
policy seems doomed to failure as it does not displace the merit principle. 
123 There is a great deal of literature discussing affirmative action laws in the US context where 
such policies have been found to be constitutional under the ‘equal protection’ clause (United 
States Constitution amend XIV): see, eg, Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 438 
US 265 (1978), affirmed in Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306 (2003); Philip C Aka, ‘The Su-
preme Court and Affirmative Action in Public Education, with Special Reference to the Michi-
gan Cases’ [2006] Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal 1. In Canada, affirma-
tive action programmes have also been upheld as constitutional: Andrews v Law Society of 
British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143. However, while the US Supreme Court has upheld affirma-
tive action laws, many commentators note that the increasing restrictions placed on such policies 
indicate that there is a danger that a more conservative Court may in the future find that affirma-
tive action is unconstitutional: see, eg, Norma M Riccucci, ‘The Immortality of Affirmative 
Action’ in Carolyn Ban and Norma M Riccucci (eds), Public Personnel Management: Current 
Concerns, Future Challenges (3rd ed, 2002) 73; Hanes Walton Jr and Robert C Smith, American 
Politics and the African American Quest for Universal Freedom (2000) 227–31; Taunya Lovell 
Banks, ‘Contested Terrains of Compensation: Equality, Affirmative Action and Diversity in the 
United States’ (1997) 15(2) Law in Context 110, 119–20. 
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measures at the institutional level.’124 While Wojciech Sadurksi also conceives of 
affirmative action as an institutional process, he defines what he calls ‘preferen-
tial treatment’ in terms of awarding benefits based on discrimination suffered. 
His description is therefore intimately connected to the moral and political 
rationale for instituting the program: 
in the processes involving selection, admission or distribution of important op-
portunities, preference should be given to persons singled out on the basis of 
those very characteristics which have been used in the past to deny them equal 
treatment.125 
Affirmative action has generally been defined in contrast to 
anti-discrimination regulation on the basis of divergent underlying assumptions 
about achieving equality. While both broadly claim to promote equality, one is 
premised on achieving equality of result and the other on achieving equality of 
procedure (that is, equal opportunity). Affirmative action, as Sadurski’s defini-
tion illustrates, is often understood as more relational, concerned with identify-
ing difference and how this has created unfair results. As many feminist com-
mentators have noted, equality of opportunity is premised on removing discrimi-
nation, but discrimination is understood broadly as making distinctions between 
people on the basis of their difference.126 Australian courts have applied this 
‘sameness’ approach in most contexts based on the notion that men and women 
are ‘equal’ and therefore different presumptions are inappropriate.127 Federal 
legislation such as the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth), Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and Age Discrimina-
tion Act 2004 (Cth)128 has tended to follow the international treaty model for 
 
124 Margaret Thornton, ‘Affirmative Action, Merit and Police Recruitment’ (2003) 28 Alternative 
Law Journal 235, 235. See also Thornton, ‘Affirmative Action, Merit and the Liberal State’, 
above n 94. 
125 Wojciech Sadurski, ‘The Morality of Preferential Treatment (The Competing Jurisprudential and 
Moral Arguments)’ (1984) 14 Melbourne University Law Review 572, 574. 
126 Similarly, in the US the majority of laws are focused on individual rights and formal equality, 
despite the constitutional protection for certain affirmative action policies. Ariane Hegewisch 
argues that the US ‘arguably has the highest levels of formal equality for women who are able to 
work full-time “like a man” but provides the least public support’ for alleviating social and legal 
disadvantages (such as a greater share of domestic labour) imposed on them: Ariane Hegewisch, 
‘Introduction’ in Ariane Hegewisch et al (eds), Working Time for Working Families: Europe and 
the United States (2005) 1. See also Martha Minow’s discussion of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ 
in legal discourse: Martha Minow, ‘Justice Engendered’ in Patricia Smith (ed), Feminist Juris-
prudence (1993) 217. 
127 For example, the sameness approach is now adopted to displace the equitable presumption of 
advancement. For a discussion of the ‘neutrality’ principle, see Lisa Sarmas, ‘A Step in the 
Wrong Direction: The Emergence of Gender ‘Neutrality’ in the Equitable Presumption of Ad-
vancement’ (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 758. Different presumptions have been 
applied in Australian cases, though not without criticism: see, eg, Brown v Brown (1993) 31 
NSWLR 582. For decisions as to the legality of ‘special measures’ laws, see, eg, 
Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70; Proudfoot v ACT Board of Health (1992) EOC 92-417. 
128 These federal laws are made primarily under the expansive external affairs power (Common-
wealth Constitution s 51(xxix)) by enacting parts of international treaties that Australia has 
ratified. These treaties include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened 
for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature 18 
December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981); International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 21 Decem-
ber 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969). These treaties also include two 
International Labour Organization conventions: the Convention Concerning Equal Remunera-
tion for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, opened for signature 29 June 1951, 
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addressing discrimination against identified groups by providing that ‘special 
measures’ which advance a certain group are legally sanctioned only as an 
exception to the general prohibition on discrimination.129 In this sense, affirma-
tive action is legally understood as a form of discrimination.130 Indeed, as Beth 
Gaze notes, the provisions of the federal anti-discrimination Acts discourage any 
form of ‘active measures’ to prevent discrimination.131 Thus, anti-discrimination 
laws in Australia are based on a principle of equality which does not include 
sanctioning any action ‘to make the anti-discrimination principle fully effective 
… to prevent [discrimination] occurring instead of merely relying on subsequent 
complaints to eliminate it’.132 
Faye Crosby and Stacy Blake-Beard provide a useful practical description of 
the differences in perspective: 
affirmative action differs from simple equal opportunity policies in several 
ways. First, affirmative action entails the expenditure of effort and resources; 
equal opportunity is more passive. Second, affirmative action is planful and 
forward looking, requiring organizations to monitor their existing actions and 
outcomes and to anticipate future problems, whereas equal opportunity is reac-
tive, requiring corrective actions only after a problem has been alleged or dis-
covered. Finally affirmative action requires that organizations be cognizant of 
the ethnic and gender characteristics of people, whereas equal opportunity does 
not. Indeed, equal opportunity seeks to encourage a ‘color blind’ and ‘gender 
blind’ approach.133 
The MBP falls within both definitions. It can be considered to be affirmative 
action because it is designed to influence briefing practices for the benefit of 
women at the Bar. It is proactive rather than responsive to one particular instance 
 
165 UNTS 303 (entered into force 23 May 1953); Convention Concerning Discrimination in 
Respect of Employment and Occupation, opened for signature 25 June 1958, 362 UNTS 31 
(entered into force 15 June 1960). 
129 While there are no constitutional restraints on state power, state laws have necessarily followed 
the federal laws so as not to be inconsistent and therefore inoperative under s 109 of the Consti-
tution. 
130 Anne Bayefsky discusses the approach adopted by international treaties and traces how the 
treaties allow for ‘special measures’ to institute equality as exceptions to the general presump-
tion that anti-discrimination is best achieved by a formal equality approach: Anne F Bayefsky, 
‘The Principle of Equality or Non-Discrimination in International Law’ (1990) 11 Human Rights 
Law Journal 1, 24–33. See also s 8(4) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 
2006 (Vic), which states that ‘[m]easures taken for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons 
or groups of persons disadvantaged because of discrimination do not constitute discrimination.’ 
131 For a discussion of the specific provisions, see Beth Gaze, ‘The Ambiguity of Affirmative 
Action in Australia’ (1997) 15(2) Law in Context 136, 145–6. 
132 Ibid 145. 
133 Faye J Crosby and Stacy Blake-Beard, ‘Affirmative Action: Diversity, Merit, and the Benefit of 
White People’ in Michelle Fine et al (eds), Off White: Readings on Power, Privilege and Resis-
tance (2004) 145, 146 (citations omitted). Similarly, Chris Ronalds describes the difference in 
anti-discrimination and affirmative action as the former being ‘an indirect and ad hoc method of 
achieving the necessary structural changes required for equal employment opportunity’: Chris 
Ronalds, Affirmative Action and Sex Discrimination: A Handbook on Legal Rights for Women 
(2nd ed, 1991) 13. By contrast, as Ronalds states (at 13), affirmative action can be understood as 
not placing the emphasis on individual solutions 
but on analysis of, and remedies for, structural discrimination which is reflected in an individ-
ual employer’s patterns of employment. An overall review of employment policies and prac-
tices addresses the underlying policies that are being pursued by an employer and promotes 
their reform insofar as they have the effect of unjustifiably disadvantaging women. The inter-
vention is proactive in nature and does not rely on an individual complaint from an aggrieved 
person. 
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of discrimination, with enforcement intended to be by those briefing rather than 
by individual women at the Bar. On the other hand, it is primarily prohibitive in 
focus and appears to adopt a sameness approach to achieving equality — it is 
based on the presumption that female barristers should be permitted to compete 
in a fair competition for briefs. It does not attempt to question the process of 
selecting counsel nor to encourage those briefing to take account of differences 
between counsel. The MBP is designed to change workplace cultures at an 
institutional level yet it does not seek to address the core aspect of disadvantage 
experienced by women in receiving briefs: how counsel is selected and the 
context within which such choices are made. 
The point here is not to redefine the MBP but to demonstrate that definitions, 
without consideration of the rationale for adopting a particular strategy, are 
meaningless. The MBP falls somewhere in the middle because it is attempting to 
promote institutional change without being criticised for instituting radical, and 
therefore possibly objectionable, policy. This article does not suggest that those 
formulating the policy held anything but high hopes for achieving real change 
for women at the Bar. Rather, the article suggests that those hopes were ham-
pered in the range of regulatory options and in the way that the policy was 
promoted. However, as Bacchi warns, this article argues that 
those who advocate substantive structural change need to ensure that they do 
not buy into conceptual frameworks which undermine their articulated goals. 
… A close study of the concepts employed in reform programmes is a neces-
sary part of this project.134 
This burden should not be placed on the shoulders of individual women at the 
Bar; rather, it should be a core element of development, promotion and imple-
mentation of policy by authoritative institutions.135 
Further, the MBP presents an opportunity to institute ‘harder’ affirmative 
action measures which, cognisant of the arguments of ‘reverse’ discrimination, 
rest on the primary goal of eliminating a recognised disadvantage. In this case, 
there is ample evidence of women’s disadvantage at the Bar, which is widely 
accepted by the legal profession and government. Although certain measures 
may advantage women, without criticisms on social or moral grounds, these 
appear to be nothing more than rhetorical objections. While the ‘merit principle’ 
is presented as an argument from principle, this article has argued that ‘merit’ 
should simply be one of many considerations for proper briefing. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the MBP should include a range of ‘harder’ 
measures to ensure the success of the initiative. This article has raised several 
compelling arguments against the imposition of mandatory quotas in private 
sector briefing which may breach duties to clients (although it is noted that such 
 
134 Carol Bacchi, ‘Policy and Discourse: Challenging the Construction of Affirmative Action as 
Preferential Treatment’ (2004) 11 Journal of European Public Policy 128, 144. 
135 McHarg and Nicolson, above n 87, 13, note that it is often the potential beneficiaries who 
shoulder the burden of demonstrating that an initiative is appropriate and justified. This has been 
called the ‘principle of proportionality’ or ‘strict scrutiny’. Hugh Collins contends that this often 
requires that the woman show that she is more deserving than her male counterpart so as not to 
attract an accusation that the appointment is unmeritorious: Hugh Collins, ‘Discrimination, 
Equality and Social Inclusion’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 16, 18. For a similar argument 
with regard to judicial selection, see Barbara Hamilton, ‘Criteria for Judicial Appointment and 
“Merit”’ (1999) 15 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 10. 
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considerations do not arise in the case of government and should therefore be 
considered in these cases). However, other strategies may be lawfully adopted.136 
The thrust of this article suggests that where we can institute more transparent 
briefing practices a fairer result will ensue. Thus, it is argued that the MBP 
should mandate identification and consideration of female counsel by requiring a 
list of candidates to be drawn and discussed with the client. It is also suggested 
that some accountability for selection should be required such as providing 
reasons for decision as to counsel in each case. While there may be an objection 
that this is an added burden to commercial practice, reporting could be in the 
form of a brief file note which is in most cases standard practice in recording 
client instructions. Such documentation could then form the basis of the other 
requirements of the MBP to monitor, review and report on briefing. This 
information would be a substantive addition to any review, rather than simply 
relying on raw numbers of female counsel briefed. More explicit requirements in 
the MBP which mandate intra-firm policies (such as education and directives 
from senior partners) and reviews each year would also ensure practical, rather 
than symbolic, compliance. 
It is further contended that we should consider other measures to assist a 
clearly identified group in need of assistance. Implementation of affirmative 
action ideals does not rest solely on the imposition of quotas. A less stringent 
form could entail setting targets. These would allow for briefing on merit, but 
provide some guidance as to appropriate levels for briefing female counsel. 
Another alternative is what Nicolson calls ‘operating decision-making prefer-
ences’.137 These can be applied in a range of ways: most commonly, where there 
are equally qualified candidates, extra ‘points’ are awarded for relevant areas of 
disadvantage. While this may result in equally qualified male barristers missing 
out on certain briefs, there is little evidence that this would result in a reduction 
of standards within the profession.138 If there are further objections in principle 
to such an approach, these must be articulated within the process of formulating 
policy. 
A related example illustrates the advantages of such a targeted strategy. In 
2007, a Victorian Bar Council subcommittee, the Equal Opportunity Committee, 
 
136 Those receiving legal services do not fall within the scope of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 
(Cth): see above n 64. Therefore, while such policies may constitute ‘discrimination’ for the 
purposes of the relevant federal or state Act, there are unlikely to be any contraventions of its 
provisions. Wider implementation of affirmative action policies such as quotas within individual 
firms may require a clearance under the relevant sex discrimination Act. Similarly, implementa-
tion of such initiatives by the federal government or its agencies may constitute a contravention 
of Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 26. However, other initiatives are unlikely to contravene 
these provisions, such as requiring appropriately qualified female counsel to be listed for con-
sideration, explaining to a client the merits of each counsel with reference to a range of relevant 
skills and providing a brief explanation for reasons for selection of counsel in each matter. 
137 Nicolson, ‘Affirmative Action in the Legal Profession’, above n 111, 122. 
138 Much US literature points to little reduction in standards for such hard affirmative action 
programmes: see, eg, Michael Selmi, ‘Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency and the Affirma-
tive Action Debate’ (1995) 42 University of California Los Angeles Law Review 1251; Alan 
Freeman, ‘Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay’ 
(1988) 23 Harvard Civil Rights — Civil Liberties Law Review 295; Randall Kennedy, ‘Persua-
sion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate’ (1986) 99 Harvard Law Re-
view 1327. 
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recommended that two places be reserved on the Council for senior women.139 
The Council has refused to endorse the proposal.140 The rationale of those 
proposing the quota was a general recognition that women were not well 
represented in the higher ranks of the Bar and barristers are far more likely to be 
appointed to senior counsel when serving on a Bar Council.141 In this context, it 
is difficult to dispute that women should be assisted, at least until their numbers 
in the senior ranks of the Bar rise. This initiative is grounded in objectives of 
substantive equality where institutional practices, rather than the deficiencies of 
those disadvantaged, are brought into focus. As Alexandra Richards argued in 
her submission supporting amendment to the Victorian Bar Council Constitution: 
‘The proposal is not about victimisation. It is about representation’.142 
VII   SOME ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
While the previous Part has proposed the implementation of ‘harder’ forms of 
affirmative action, it is conceded that this article has not provided a fulsome 
argument for implementation of such measures. That is, I have not examined the 
rationales for affirmative action, but rather the principal argument against it — 
that it contravenes the merit principle.143 It has been contended that the merit 
principle does not provide a strong rationale to reject affirmative action, and that 
we must therefore engage in a proper debate about the underlying rationale of 
any policy. This article has not provided a further discussion of this debate as it 
has not been held in relation to this policy. In this Part, I provide a brief overview 
of the nature of such a debate with reference to the very few arguments raised in 
formulating the policy. 
As McHarg and Nicolson argue, there is no one ‘legitimating principle’ for 
affirmative action or any other regulatory strategy.144 A great range of justifica-
tions have been made by scholars and regulators, and thus only the most promi-
nent ones are mentioned here. One rationale is policy as a form of compensatory 
 
139 The quota system proposed requires that if more than two women are nominated in the senior 
category of council members, the two with the most votes automatically have a place; if there is 
only one woman nominated, then she automatically receives a place: Equal Opportunity Com-
mittee, The Victorian Bar Inc, Bar Council Proposal to Alter Constitution to Provide for Mini-
mum Number of Entrenched Positions for Female Members of Counsel in Senior Category 
(2007); Alexandra Richards, A Case in Favour of the Special Resolution to Amend Clause 10 of 
the Constitution (2007).This system is similar to the requirements for the Queensland Bar Coun-
cil as set out in the constitution of the Queensland Bar Association: Constitution of the Bar of 
Association of Queensland cl 10.1 <http://www.qldbar.asn.au/index.php?option=com_content 
&task=view&id=29&Itemid=33>.  
140 The Victorian Bar Inc, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution: Explanatory Memorandum 
(2007) 4 (recommendation 14); Susannah Moran, ‘Bar Opportunity Not Knocking for Women’, 
The Australian (Sydney), 31 August 2007, 38. 
141 Michael Pelly, ‘NSW Bar Tightens Selection of Silks’, The Australian (Sydney), 14 September 
2007, 29. 
142 Richards, above n 139, 8. The special resolution was considered by the members of the Victorian 
Bar at an annual general meeting on 17 September 2007. I am not aware of any publicly avail-
able minutes of the meeting. However, no amendment was made to the Victorian Bar constitu-
tion as proposed in the special resolution. 
143 For other arguments against affirmative action, see Thomas Nagel, ‘Equal Treatment and 
Compensatory Discrimination’ (1973) 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 348, 357–8. 
144 McHarg and Nicolson, above n 87, 3. 
     
2008] Model Advocates or a Model for Change? 379 
     
justice.145 However, as Bacchi argues, this is probably an inadequate practical 
justification for policies assisting women in the workforce.146 Another rationale 
is based on distributive justice. There has long been an argument for implement-
ing affirmative action based on ‘distributive justice’.147 For example, a similar, 
though less individual-focused, version is proposed by McHarg and Nicolson 
which they described as an argument from a social utility perspective.148 This 
approach embraces an understanding of the policy as preferential, yet casts this 
as simply a new member of uncontroversial measures which are understood as 
‘contributing to some overarching social or organizational goal.’149 As they point 
out, social goals such as inclusion and social harmony are generally acceptable 
as rationales for ‘maternity leave, subsidised childcare or even the minimum 
wage’, because they are seen as benefiting society rather than the disadvantaged 
individual.150 
Another social utility rationale is that a policy promotes diversity. Nicolson 
provides compelling arguments for promoting diversity such as the inherent 
value of alternative styles of lawyering which may be appropriate in certain 
matters. Lawyers from previously excluded groups may act as role models and 
may exhibit less of a tendency to perpetuate discriminatory thinking and 
practices.151 The consultation draft of the Implementation Kit for the MBP states 
that ‘the promotion of such equal opportunity accords with Australian society’s 
expectations and [is] in furtherance of a legal profession which more truly 
reflects the diversity of that society and its responsiveness to it.’152 This justifi-
cation postulated in support of the MBP is broader than formal equality (which 
the MBP proposes) and articulates a plausible social good for adoption of the 
policy. It is a pity then that such sentiments did not translate into a stronger 
rationale for considering a range of policy options. As has been discussed in this 
article, when we consider the range of skills and talents that may be employed at 
the Bar which may be the result of a process of transparent and accountable 
 
145 See, eg, Gertrude Ezorsky, Racism and Justice: The Case for Affirmative Action (1991); Bikhu 
Parekh, ‘A Case for Positive Discrimination’ in Bob Hepple and Erika M Szyszczak (eds), Dis-
crimination: The Limits of the Law (1992) 261. 
146 Carol Lee Bacchi, The Politics of Affirmative Action: ‘Women’, Equality and Category Politics 
(1996). 
147 See, eg, Ronald J Fiscus, The Constitutional Logic of Affirmative Action (1992); Gwyneth Pitt, 
‘Can Reverse Discrimination Be Justified?’ in Bob Hepple and Erika M Szyszczak (eds), Dis-
crimination: The Limits of the Law (1992) 281. 
148 McHarg and Nicolson, above n 87, 15–19. See also Collins, above n 135. 
149 McHarg and Nicolson, above n 87, 15. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Donald Nicolson, ‘Demography, Discrimination and Diversity: A New Dawn for the British 
Legal Profession?’ (2005) 12 International Journal of the Legal Profession 201, 217–20. See 
also Barbara Hamilton’s discussion of the advantages of a diverse judiciary which refer to a 
large scholarship supporting this idea: Hamilton, above n 135, 17–20. 
152 Law Council of Australia, Model Equal Opportunity Briefing Policy for Female Barristers and 
Advocates — Implementation Kit: Consultation Draft (2007) 4 (on file with author). This state-
ment comes from the opening message of Tim Bugg, the Law Council President. A consultation 
draft of an Implementation Kit for the MBP was produced by the Law Council of Australia on 23 
June 2007. The stated aims are to ‘raise awareness’ of the MBP and to ‘promote broad adoption 
of the Model Briefing Policy by the private legal profession’: Letter from Peter Webb, Secre-
tary-General, Law Council of Australia to Constituent Bodies of the Law Council of Australia, 
23 June 2007 (on file with author). This letter was attached to the front of the consultation draft. 
Without any legislative power to enforce the MBP, the Law Council of Australia is sensibly 
focusing on encouraging private legal practitioners to adopt the policy. 
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briefing practices, diversity becomes an attractive feature for the profession and 
individual clients. Moreover, diversity at the Bar contributes to shared social 
goals. 
Hunter supports a similar diversity argument formulated as a business case for 
private practice.153 She refers to government implementation as a means of 
providing financial incentives to those working for government to implement the 
policy. This taps into a clearly major factor in the professional motivations for 
private lawyers. However, as she notes, this is only a partial solution that covers 
a small part of the private legal profession. Indeed, as this article has argued, 
there are deeper concerns for a rationale focused on women’s conformity to an 
unchanged profession.154 Clare McGlynn, Lisa Webley and Liz Duff criticise the 
‘business case’ put forward for promoting women within the English and Welsh 
legal professions.155 McGlynn describes the use of human capital theory, which 
contends that losing women from the legal profession through discrimination 
results from a lack of recognition of the worth of individual workers and is bad 
for business. However, she argues that the focus on profit maximisation, 
therefore, implies that there is no other rationale (such as equality for women) on 
which to base encouragement of women in the legal profession. Consequently, 
where an employer does not perceive a business case for promoting women 
within their organisation, there is no further reason (professionally or ethically) 
to provide equality for women.156 A similar argument can be made in respect of 
the MBP where individual solicitors may cite overriding concerns of client 
duties and financial or efficiency considerations. Where we can articulate an 
alternative and attractive approach, this may better engender a change in 
practices. For instance, it could be contended that providing advice on a range of 
available talent may advance client interests which fulfils an important profes-
sional duty, and will encourage a diverse workplace which may raise the 
standards of the Bar.157 
There is one further rationale against implementing an affirmative action 
policy that was hinted at in the Issues Paper of the federal Attorney-General’s 
Department — the Department expressed a concern that such strategies would 
‘generate opposition’.158 Is policy that agitates opposition so objectionable? Is a 
policy which is entirely uncontroversial, yet ineffectual, a better one? While no 
other comment was made in the Issues Paper (suggesting that this was a point 
that had been decided and required no further debate), I infer that it is a reference 
 
153 Hunter, ‘Discrimination against Women Barristers’, above n 13, 38. 
154 In recent times, the focus has again changed from equal opportunity to ‘managing diversity’, 
which reduces the focus on the disadvantage of groups in favour of a managerial task of dealing 
with a diverse workforce: see Bacchi, The Politics of Affirmative Action, above n 146, 51–4. 
155 Clare M S McGlynn, ‘Strategies for Reforming the English Solicitors’ Profession: An Analysis 
of the Business Case for Sex Equality’ in Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw (eds), Women in the 
World’s Legal Professions (2003) 159. Similarly, Duff and Webley describe the ‘business case’ 
but conclude that it is not only ‘actively undermining the position of women in the profession, 
[but] now also perhaps its more traditional constituency — men’: Liz Duff and Lisa Webley, 
‘Women Solicitors as a Barometer for Problems within the Legal Profession — Time to Put 
Values before Profits?’ (2007) 34 Journal of Law and Society 374, 382. 
156 McGlynn, above n 155, 166–72. 
157 See, eg, Justice Mary Gaudron’s discussion of the question as to why the Bar did not appreciate 
‘that male lawyers would have been improved by the competition with the consequential im-
provement in the availability and quality of legal services’: Gaudron, above n 14. 
158 Issues Paper, above n 91, 22. 
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to a long held concern that affirmative action policies may exacerbate discrimi-
nation against a group (being provided with assistance).159 This may be because 
it is understood pejoratively as ‘preferential treatment’ connoting a lack of 
equality and discrimination against a dominant group (such as male barristers). 
Alternatively, such policy may entrench those very prejudices to be remedied 
and stigmatise all members of the group as unworthy to occupy positions 
provided. In the context of women in the legal profession, there is some evidence 
that a perception of ‘unworthy’ appointment to senior positions (such as eleva-
tion to the bench) increases publicly articulated prejudices.160 However, this 
argument appears to doom groups subject to discrimination to their fate by the 
very fact of this prejudice. This is surely not a sufficient argument by which to 
dismiss the consideration of such a policy. 
VIII   CONCLUSION 
This article does not attempt to prefer any one justification for affirmative 
action in this case. It also does not seek to prescribe one form of affirmative 
action measure (although certain suggestions have been made). Rather, this 
article argues for a step before this debate. It is contended that as part of the 
regulatory response to women’s disadvantage at the Bar, a range of options 
should be considered. In the current climate, we have dispensed with this policy 
approach due to an excessive obedience to an undefined idea of merit. The 
article has examined the meaning of both merit and affirmative action in order to 
refute the assumption of a dichotomous relationship between them. It is con-
comitantly argued that the privileging of merit as the supreme consideration is 
questionable. It is only when proper attention is paid to principle rather than 
rhetorical strategy that we can engage in a more rigorous debate. Careful 
consideration of the context of briefing practices indicates that a regulatory 
approach must adopt more mandatory and specific measures in order to effect 
change. This article has attempted to conceive of alternatives which are based in 
making practices more transparent and accountable. Further discussion and 
analysis must now occur. 
 
159 See, eg, Nagel, above n 143. 
160 See, eg, Hamilton’s discussion of the appointment of Roslyn Atkinson to the Supreme Court of 
Queensland: Hamilton, above n 135. 
